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PREFACE 
Risks  have emerged a s  an  impor t an t  c o n s t r a i n t  i n  t h e  
e v a l u a t i o n  and s e l e c t i o n  o f  energy s t r a t e g i e s .  The work of  
t h e  J o i n t  IAEA/IIASA Risk Assessment P r o j e c t  (IAEA: I n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  Atomic Energy Agency) i s  o r i e n t e d  toward p rov id ing  
i n f o r ma t ion  on t e c h n o l o g i c a l  r i s k s ,  and t h e i r  s o c i a l  a s p e c t s ,  
f o r  use  i n  d e c i s i o n s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  management of r i s k s .  
The emphasis of t h i s  r e s e a r c h  i s  upon energy  systems.  
Th i s  Research Memorandum b r i n g s  t o g e t h e r  t h e  s c a t t e r e d  
l i t e r a t u r e  on fo rma l  t h e o r i e s  o f  r i s k  and r i s k  p r e f e r e n c e .  
The v a r i o u s  approaches  a r e  p r e sen t ed  and c r i t i c a l l y  d i s c u s s e d ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  w i t h  r e f e r e n c e  t o  expec ted  u t i l i t y  t heo ry ,  which 
i s  t h e  s t a n d a r d  t h e o r y  o f  d e c i s i o n  making under  u n c e r t a i n t y .  
A s  f a r  as a v a i l a b l e ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  of  exper imenta l  tes ts  of 
t h e  t h e o r i e s  a r e  p r e s e n t e d ,  t oo .  F i n a l l y ,  more g e n e r a l  
a s p e c t s  of  r i s k  a r e  d i s c u s s e d ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h o s e  r e l a t e d  t o  
new energy t e chno log i e s .  

ABSTRACT 
The n o t i o n  o f  " r i s k "  p l a y s  an  impor tan t  r o l e  i n  d e c i s i o n s  
abou t  modern t e chno log i e s .  W e  have t o  l e a r n  t h e  d i s comfo r t i ng  
l e s s o n  t h a t  modern t e chno log i e s  do n o t  on ly  p rov ide  b e n e f i t s ,  
b u t  a l s o  " r i s k s " ,  p o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of monetary v a l u e s ,  o f  
environmenta l  q u a l i t y ,  of  h e a l t h ,  o r  even l i f e .  But what 
e x a c t l y  i s  meant by t h e  t e r m  " r i s k " ?  The p r e s e n t  paper  con- 
s i d e r s  more fo rmal  a s p e c t s  of  " r i s k " .  The concep t  of r i s k  i n  
mathematical  s t a t i s t i c s  and expected u t i l i t y  t heo ry  i s  d i s c u s s e d  
i n  some d e t a i l .  The major p a r t  of  t h e  paper  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  
e x i s t i n g  formal ax iomat ic  (measurement- theoret ic)  t h e o r i e s  o f  
r i s k  and r i s k  p r e f e r ence .  
Risk r e f e r s  t o  t h e  pe rcep t i on  of t h e  r i s k i n e s s  of a n  
o p t i o n  ( r i s k  e s t i m a t i o n ) ,  whereas r i s k  p r e f e r e n c e  r e f e r s  t o  
d e c i s i o n  makers'  p r e f e r e n c e s  over  a  set o f  r i s k y  op t i ons .  
Some people a r e  r i s k  s e e k e r s ,  t hey  l i k e  gambling, o r  mountain 
c l imbing etc . ,  o t h e r s  p r e f e r  t o  be  on t h e  s a f e  s i d e .  These 
t h e o r i e s  are d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n  t o  each  o t h e r  and t o  
expected u t i l i t y  t heo ry .  The p o s i t i o n  is formulated t h a t  
expec ted  u t i l i t y  t h e o r y  does  n o t  d e a l  w i t h  r i s k  i n  an adequate  
and p sycho log i ca l l y  meaningful  way. Some r e s u l t s  of e m p i r i c a l  
tests of  t h e  v a r i o u s  t h e o r i e s  a r e  a l s o  p r e sen t ed .  
The paper  c l o s e s  w i th  a more g e n e r a l  d i s c u s s i o n  of  a s p e c t s  
of r i s k  concerning t e c h n o l o g i c a l  and s o c i a l  d e c i s i o n s .  I t  may 
very  we l l  be t h e  c a s e  t h a t  a s p e c t s  of r i s k  have t o  be consid-  
e r e d  t h a t  do n o t  e n t e r  i n  t h e  formal t h e o r i e s  as they are 
formulated a t  p r e s e n t .  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The t e r m  " r i s k "  seems t o  p l ay  an impor tan t  r o l e  i n  much of  
t h e  c u r r e n t  w r i t i n g  on p o l i t i c a l ,  soc i a1 , and  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  is- 
sues .  E s p e c i a l l y  f o r  t h e  l a t t e r ,  w e  f i n d  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  t h e  r i s k  
of  t h e  v a r i o u s  s o u r c e s  of  energy ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  of cou r se ,  
atomic energy,  power p l a n t s ,  was te  d i s p o s a l ,  e t c .  More and 
more w e  l e a r n  t h e  l e s s o n  t h a t  technology does n o t  o n l y  gua ran t ee  
b e n e f i t s  of v a r i o u s  k i n d s ,  b u t  a l s o  " r i sk sn - -haza rds ,  p o t e n t i a l  
l o s s  o f  equipment, o f  h e a l t h ,  and e v e n t u a l l y  even of l i f e .  
These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  r a d i a t e  a l s o  i n t o  t h e  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  
sphere ,  we f i n d  ph ra se s  l i k e  " s o c i a l  r i s k  of t h e  n u c l e a r  
o p t i o n " ,  o r  " r i s k  of  an  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  development" due t o  ex- 
c e s s i v e  s a f e t y  requ i rements  of t h e  n u c l e a r  o p t i o n s  and many 
o t h e r s .  Almost always t h e  t e r m  " r i s k "  i s  l e f t  undef ined,  i s  
used i n  an eve ryday - l i f e  meaning. But f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  purposes ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  when w e  t r y  t o  measure r i s k  we have t o  d e f i n e  it 
and g i v e  an o p e r a t i o n a l  d e f i n i t i o n  f i r s t .  Th i s  might  seem t o  
be  a  r a t h e r  e a sy  t a s k  a t  a  f i r s t  g l ance ,  b u t  it i s  no t .  There 
i s  much f u z z i n e s s  and disagreement  about  it, a s  w i l l  be  e v i d e n t  
l a t e r .  Th i s  paper  is addressed  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of  what w e  mean 
when we t a l k  about  " r i s k " .  
I t  might b e  h e l p f u l  t o  g ive  a  s h o r t  o u t l i n e  of t h e  t e x t  t o  
fo l low.  F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  w e  s h a l l  t r a c e  some of t h e  d e f i n i t i o n s  
o f  t h e  t e r m  " r i s k " .  Next, we w i i l  have a  look how " r i s k "  i s  
de f ined  and used i n  v a r i o u s  branches  of s c i e n c e ,  i n  which it 
p lays  a  r o l e .  Th i rd ,  some e m p i r i c a l  psycholog ica l  work is  
r e p o r t e d  t h a t  was devoted t o  t h e  s t udy  of  r i s k ,  which had an 
ou t f low i n  f i r s t  a t t e m p t s  t o  fo rmula te  t h e o r i e s  of  r i s k  and 
r i s k  p r e f e r e n c e ,  which a r e  s t u d i e d  n e x t ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  some 
exper iments  t h a t  t e s t e d  t h e i r  e m p i r i c a l  a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s .  
F i n a l l y ,  it is  ana lyzed  whether " r i s k "  g a i n s  a  new dimension 
when a p p l i e d  t o  l a r g e - s c a l e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  problems. 
2 -  SOME HISTORY AND "AD HOC" DEFINITIONS OF RISK 
Obviously,  t h e  t e r m  " r i s k "  i s  used t o  denote  very  d i f f e r e n t  
t h i n g s .  Many a u t h o r s  use  r i s k  synonymously w i t h  u n c e r t a i n t y ,  
e . g . ,  t h e y  speak of " d e c i s i o n  making under r i s k "  i n s t e a d  of 
" d e c i s i o n  making under u n c e r t a i n t y " .  Some use  it synonymously 
w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  (of a  nega t i ve  e v e n t )  , such a s  " t h e  r i s k  t h a t  
a  p a t i e n t  ha s  a  c e r t a i n  i l l n e s s "  (Norusis ,  1973, p. 1 0 ) .  
F i s chho f f ,  e t  a l .  (1977) d e f i n e  r i s k  a s  t h e  pe rce ived  probab i l -  
i t y  o f  dy ing  from v a r i o u s  sources .  Knight (1921) ,  i n  h i s  much- 
quoted e a r l y  work, uses  " r i s k "  f o r  an o b j e c t i v e  and measurable 
u n c e r t a i n t y ,  wh i l e  t h e  t e r m  " u n c e r t a i n t y "  i s  r e s e r v e d  f o r  sub- 
j e c t i v e  and non-measurable u n c e r t a i n t y .  Th i s  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  
i s  s t i l l  made today by some au tho r s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  the German 
economic l i t e r a t u r e .  More r e c e n t l y ,  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
r i s k  and u n c e r t a i n t y  ha s  become less c l e a r  s i n c e  t h e  Bayesian 
approach t o  p r o b a b i l i t y  assumes t h a t  a l l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  a r e  
s u b j e c t i v e  and t h a t  t h e r e  i s  hard ly  eve r  complete l ack  of 
knowledge. 
Some au tho r s  u se  " r i s k "  on ly  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
of  ( f i n a n c i a l )  l o s s e s ,  e - g . ,  Redlich (1957, p. 35) , who says ,  
"To r e p e a t ,  i n  my language,  ' r i s k 1  i s  equated wi th  t h e  chance 
of l o s s  and t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  a p p l i e s  t o  both bus iness  and non- 
bus iness  ' r i s k 1  " . 
The no t ion  of r i s k  a s  used by Redlich and many o t h e r s  i s  
i n  l i n e  wi th  what has  been c a l l e d  "pure" r i s k :  Only p o t e n t i a l  
l o s s e s  are a f f e c t e d .  I f  a l s o  p o t e n t i a l  ga ins  (and t h e i r  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of occurrence)  a r e  t o  be considered t o  have an 
impact on " r i s k " ,  then  t h i s  i s  c a l l e d  " specu la t ive"  r i s k  by 
some au thors .  
I f  g a i n s  and l o s s e s  and t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  a r e  
involved,  it is  very  p r a c t i c a l  t o  in t roduce  t h e  no t ion  of a 
l o t t e r y  ( o r  gamble) which i s  def ined  as a p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u -  
t i o n  over  outcomes ( o r  consequences, which w i l l  be used 
synonyrnously~. A l o t t e r y  L i s  then def ined  a s  a set of probabi l -  
i t ies  pi and a set of consequences x which occur wi th  probabi l -  i 
i t i e s p  i =  i' 1, 2 ,  . n Some of t h e  consequences might be  
l o s s e s ,  o t h e r s  ga ins ,  wi th  "win" and " lose"  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  
a t t ached  t o  t h e m .  Pure r i s k ,  then ,  r e f e r s  t o  l o t t e r i e s  t h a t  
a r e  def ined  ove r  t h e  nega t ive  p a r t  of t h e  real l i n e ,  whereas 
t h e r e  a r e  no such r e s t r i c t i o n s  i n  t h e  case  of " specu la t ive"  
r i s k .  From a pure ly  formal p o i n t  o f  view, t h e r e  might n o t  be 
much t o  it t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  between t h e  two, b u t  psychologica l ly  
t h e r e  might very  w e l l  be  a d i f f e r e n c e .  
There a r e  i n  p r i n c i p l e  two ways t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  probabi l -  
i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  over  outcomes. I n  t h e  d i s c r e t e  ca se  one could 
use  t h e  s e t  o f  consequences (xi] t oge the r  w i th  t h e i r  probabi l -  
i t y  of occurrance {pi) , i = 1, 2 ,  . n. A simple l o t t e r y  
could then be given by ( $ 5 ,  +; $-3,  +), i .e.,  t h e  r i s k y  o p t i o n s  
of winning f i v e  d o l l a r s  w i th  p r o b a b i l i t y  of one h a l f ,  o r  
l oos ing  t h r e e  d o l l a r s  wi th  t h e  same p r o b a b i l i t y .  A d i f f e r e n t  
way t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  lot teries would be by t h e i r  moments, t h a t  
is, expected va lue  ( E ) ,  var i ance  (V), skewness ( S K ) ,  and s o  on. 
For two-outcome gambles of  t h e  type (a ,  p; b,  1-p3 a s  used i n  
t h e  example, t h e  moments a r e  as fo l lows  
w i t h  a  > b. I n  t h e  con t inuous  c a s e ,  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  
o v e r  outcomes can  o n l y  be de sc r i bed  by t h e i r  moments. Which 
p a r a m e t r i z a t i o n  t o  use  i n  t h e  d i s c r e t e  c a s e  w i l l  depend 
p r i m a r i l y  on t h e  r i s k  model t o  be used.  
A l t e r n a t i v e l y  t o  t h e s e  p a r a m e t r i z a t i o n s ,  l o t t e r i e s  cou ld  be 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by t h e  whole u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  I f  expec ted  u t i l i t y  
models a r e  used,  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  t o  t h e  pa r ame t r i c  c a s e  i s  less 
clear s i n c e  some of t h o s e  models l e a d  t o  ( r e s t r i c t e d  forms) of 
expected  u t i l i t y  models. 
A n a t u r a l  e x t e n s i o n  would be n o t  t o  c o n s i d e r  l o s s e s  p e r  set 
b u t  expec ted  l o s s e s ,  o r  average  l o s s .  T h i s  cou ld  be set i n t o  
p e r s p e c t i v e  t o  t h e  p o s i t i v e  side,  i . e . ,  expec t ed  g a i n s .  Domar 
and Musgrave (1944) d e f i n e  t h e  u t i l i t y  of  a  l o t t e r y  a s  expec ted  
g a i n s  minus ex p ec t ed  l o s s .  
Once t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  fo rmal ized  a s  a  cho i ce  between 
l o t t e r i e s ,  o r  a  l o t t e r y  and a  s u r e  t h i n g ,  it seems obvious  
t h a t  r i s k  cou ld  depend on numerica l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o r  para-  
meters, o f  l o t t e r i e s ,  such a s  
( a )  t h e  ex p ec t ed  v a l u e  (mean) of t h e  l o t t e r y - - t h e  
h i g h e r  t h e  s t a k e s ,  t h e  more r i s k y  t h e  o p t i o n ,  
and more i m p o r t an t ,  
(.b) some i n d ex  of d i s p e r s i o n  o f  the l o t t e r y - - t h e  
l a r g e r  t h e  d i s p e r s i o n ,  t h e  h i g h e r  t h e  pe r ce ived  
r i s k .  
It i s  i n t u i t i v e l y  e v i d e n t  t h a t  t h e  r i s k  o f  an o p t i o n  
depends i n  p a r t  on t h e  expec ted  value-- if  much i s  a t  s t a k e ,  t h e  I 
whole t h i n g  ap p ea r s  r i s k i e r .  But on t h e  o t h e r  hand t h e  
p e r c e i v ed  r i s k  o f  an  o p t i o n  w i l l  a l s o  depend on "what else 
c o u l d  happen". Th e r e f o r e ,  some measure o f  d i s p e r s i o n  seems t o  
be t h e  prime c a n d i d a t e  f o r  " r i s k "  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e .  The f i r s t  
one ,  t o  my knowledge, t o  propose a measure of  d i s p e r s i o n  t o  
q u a n t i f y  r i s k  was Te tens  (1786 ) ,  who proposed one-half of t h e  
mean d e v i a t i o n .  Markowitz proposed r i s k  t o  be e i t h e r  t h e  
v a r i a n c e  o r  t h e  semi-var iance  around a  chosen v a l u e ,  d e f i n e d  by 
vb = 
f o r  a l l  x  I xb 
The semi-var iance  is t h e n  t h e  mean squared  d e v i a t i o n  o f  a l l  x  
below xb, which i s  a  f r e e  parameter  and can  be set  t o  t h e  dec i -  
s i o n  makers '  ch o i ce  (e .g . ,  xb cou ld  be a  t a r g e t  r a t e  of r e t u r n ,  
and o n l y  d e v i a t i o n s  t o  t h e  l e f t  of it  cou ld  be c o n s i d e r e d ) .  I f  
xb i s  set eq u a l  t o  z e r o ,  Vo i s  t h e  " v a r i a n c e  over  l o s s e s " .  S ince  
l o t t e r i e s  d o  n o t  have t o  be symmetric,  t h e  semi-var iance  i s  n o t  
e q u a l  t o  one h a l f  of  t h e  v a r i a n c e  and skewness may v e r y  w e l l  
have an  impact  on r i s k  p e r cep t i on .  Such models w e r e  d i s c u s s e d  
by Markowitz (1959),  Mao (1970a, b ) ,  Hoc~an and Warren (1972, 
19741, and b y  P o r t e r  (1974) .  
I n  a n  ex p e r i m en t a l  c o n t e x t ,  P o l l a t s e k  (1966) used t h e  range  
a s  a n  i n d i c a t o r  of r i s k ,  whi le  Rapoport (1970) o r  Royden, Suppes 
and Walsh (195'9) used t h e  v a r i a n c e .  Measures of  d i s p e r s i o n  a l s o  
p l a y  a n  i m p o r t an t  r o l e  i n  fo rmal  r i s k  t h e o r i e s .  I t  seems c l e a r  
t h a t  some n o t i o n  of d i s p s r s i o n  must be  an i n g r e d i e n t  i n  any  
d e f i n i t i o n  or  t h e o r y  o f  r i s k .  
D e f i n i t i o n s  or models of  r i s k  can  be c l a s s i f i e d  acco rd ing  
t o  s e v e r a l  p o i n t s  o f  view, The most impor t an t  a s p e c t s  a r e  
whether  one  o r  more t h a n  one pa ramete r  is  invo lved ,  and i f  
s e v e r a l  pa ramete r s  have t o  be cons ide r ed ,  whether  t h e  model is  
compensatory o r  noncompensatory. Examples o f  s i n g l e  pa ramete r  
models a r e  t h e  maximum ex p ec t ed  r e t u r n  model ( l o t t e r y  A i s  
p r e f e r r e d  t o  B i f  and o n l y  i f  A h a s  a h i g h e r  e x p e c t a t i o n  t h a n  
B) o r  t h e  minimum l o s s  p r o b a b i l i t y  model ( A  i s  p r e f e r r e d  t o  B 
i f  it h a s  a s m a l l e r  loss p r o b a b i l i t y ) .  I f  more t h a n  one pa ra -  
m e t e r  i s  invo lved ,  models c an  be e i t h e r  compensatory o r  non- 
compensatory. I n  compensatory models a bad v a l u e  of one pa ra -  
m e t e r  c a n  be counter-balanced by a good v a l u e  i n  some o t h e r  
parameter- - the  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  pa ramete r s  a r e  t r a d e d  o f f  a g a i n s t  
e a c h  o t h e r .  The most well-known two parameter  t r ade -o f f  model 
is t h e  mean-variance t r ad e - o f f  model, a s  proposed i n  Markowitz' 
(1959) p o r t f o l i o  t h eo r y .  Obvious v a r i a n t s  o f  such models a r e  
mean-standard d e v i a t i o n  t r a d e - o f f ,  mean-semivariance t r a d e - o f f ,  
mean-probab i l i ty  o f  loss t r a d e - o f f ,  e tc  . (Libby and F i shbu rn ,  
19771. Such models  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  by many a u t h o r s ,  i n c l u d i n g  
Borch (1969, 19741, Ts i an g  (1972, 19741, and Levy (19741. 
Some r e f e r e n c e s  f o r  t h e  mean-semivariance t r ade-of f  model w e r e  
g i v e n  above. 
The m o s t  prominent  c l a s s  of  noncompensatory r i s k  models a r e  
l e x i c o g r a p h i c  models. L o t t e r y  A is  p r e f e r r e d  t o  l o t t e r y  B i f  
and o n l y  i f  t h e  r i s k  v a l u e  o f  A i s  s m a l l e r  t h a n  of  B ( o r ,  i f  
t h e  r i s k  v a l u e s  a r e  t h e  s a m e ,  i f  A h a s  a h i g h e r  e x p e c t a t i o n  t h a n  
B ) .  The r l s k  v a l u e  cou ld  b e  equa t ed  w i t h  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of 
" r u i n " ,  f o r  example. Some s i m i l a r  models a r e  d i s c u s s e d  i n  Libby 
and F i s h b u r n  ( 1 9 7 7 ) ,  a g e n e r a l  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  such models c a n  b e  
found i n  F i sh b u r n  (1974) .  
Mean and v a r i a n c e  a r e ,  o f  cou r se ,  moments o f  a p r o b a b i l i t y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n .  I f  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  a r e  o f  a normal t y p e ,  
t h e s e  two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  comple te ly  de te rmine  
t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  To d e s c r i b e  more g e n e r a l  t y p e s  of  d i s t r i b u -  
t i o n s ,  more moments a r e  needed.  E s p e c i a l l y  t h e  r e l a t i o n  between 
t h e  t h i r d  moment, skewness,  and the f o u r t h ,  k u r t o s i s ,  have t o  b e  
ana lyzed  i n  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n  t o  " r i s k v .  But  till now t h e r e  a r e  no 
formal  d e f i n i t i o n s  o r  models o f  r i s k  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  t h e s e  h igher -  
o r d e r  moments. 
The o n l y  agreement r e s e a r c h e r s  i n  t h e  a r e a  o f  " r i s k "  cou ld  
r e a c h  up t o  now seems t o  b e  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  t h e r e  is  no 
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  r i s k  which cou ld  be accep t ed  by any l a r g e r  f r a c t i o n  
of  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  community. N o t  o n l y  migh t  r i s k  p e r c e p t i o n  and 
r i s k  e v a l u a t i o n  be a h i g h l y  i d i o s y n c r a t i c  e n t e r p r i s e ,  t h e  same 
may h o l d  t r u e  f o r  r i s k  d e f i n i t i o n s  and models.  
3 .  THE CONCEPT OF RISK ACROSS SCIENCES 
I n  t h e  fo l lowing  s e c t i o n s  t h e  concep ts  and d e f i n i t i o n s  of 
r i s k  a r e  analyzed a s  t h e y  appear  i n  v a r i o u s  branches  of s c i e n c e  
wi thou t  t r y i n g  t o  ach i eve  completeness.  W e  w i l l  t h e n  ( i n  
Chapter  5 )  t r y  t o  f i n d  o u t  (1) what t h e  d e f i n i t i o n s  have i n  
common o r  where t h e y  d i f f e r ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  and ( 2 )  whether  
t h e y  ag ree  w i th ,  o r  d i f f e r  from t h e  p sycho log i ca l ,  p re -  
s c i e n t i f i c  meaning of  t h e  t e r m  " r i s k " .  
The Concept o f  Risk i n  Mathematical  S t a t i s t i c s  
The fo l lowing  p r e s e n t a t i o n  is  i n  t h e  s p i r i t  of  t h e  
d e c i s i o n - t h e o r e t i c  approach t o  mathematical  stat is t ics ,  s i n c e  
" r i s k "  p l a y s  a  less impor tan t  r o l e  i n  " c l a s s i c a l "  stat is t ics .  
The d e f i n i t i o n s  f o l l o w  c l o s e l y  t hose  o f  Ferguson (1967) ,  see 
a l s o  R a i f f a  and S c h l a i f e r  (1961) and DeGroot (1970) f o r  s i m i l a r  
t r e a tmen t s .  Only t h o s e  concep ts  of  d e c i s i o n  t h e o r y  are i n t r o -  
duced which are needed f o r  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of  " r i s k " .  
D e f i n i t i o n s  
a  nonempty set, c a l l e d  a l t e r n a t i v e l y  
s t a t e s  o f  n a t u r e ,  hypotheses ,  or 
parameter  space ,  depending on t h e  
c o n t e x t  i n  which t h e y  are used;  
g e n e r i c  element 8 
a  nonempty set ,  c a l l e d  a c t i o n  space ,  
a c t i o n s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
maker (DM) ; g e n e r i c  e lement  a 
a random v a r i a b l e ,  whose d i s t r i b u t i o n  
depends on 8; x i n d i c a t e s  an  
o b s e r v a t i o n  of  X 
sample space  ( taken h e r e  as f i n i t e  
d imensional  Eucl idean space)  
p r o b a b i l i t y  measure, d e f i n e d  on 
(.Borel) s u b s e t s  o f  S 
p r o b a b i l i t y  measure, d e f i n e d  on 
8 € H f o r  s u b s e t s  of S 
7, L ( 8 , a l  r ea l -va lued  f u n c t i o n ,  d e f i n e d  on  t h e  
C a r t e s i a n  p roduc t  o f  H and A. 
A s t a t i s t i ca l  d e c i s i o n  problem ( o r  "game" can  be  charac-  
t e r i z e d  by t h e  t r i p l e  ( H ,  A, L ) ;  "na tu r e "  chooses  a 8 i n  H and 
a n  a c t o r  ( t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker; DM) chooses an  a c t i o n  a  i n  A. Be- 
f o r  choosing a ,  t h e  a c t o r  does  n o t  know t h e  " t r u e  s t a t u e  o f  na- 
t u r e "  nor  h a s  he any i n f l u e n c e  on na tu r e .  Depending j o i n t l y  on  
h i s  a c t i o n  a  and n a t u r e ' s  8, t h e  DM w i l l  s u f f e r  a  loss L(8 ,  a ) .  
The l o s s  i s  ze ro  i f  t h e  DM chooses t h e  b e s t  a c t i o n  i n  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n .  
To be  a b l e  t o  choose t h e  b e s t  a c t i o n ,  t h e  DM w i l l  want t o  
g e t  some informat ion.  H e  ob ta ins  informat ion by performing an 
experiment i n  which he observes  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  (outcome) x  of 
a  random v a r i a b l e  X ,  t h e  dens i ty  Pe of which depends on t h e  0 
choosen by na tu re .  The a c t i o n  t h e  DM w i l l  t ake  depends, of 
course ,  on x. A d e c i s i o n  func t ion  i s  a  func t ion  d:  X -, A 
which p reas s igns  a d e c i s i o n  a  = d(X) t o  each observa t ion .  
The l o s s  t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker w i l l  s u f f e r  depends on t h e  
random v a r i a b l e  X. Therefore ,  t h e  l o s s  i t s e l f  can be consid-  
e r e d  a s  a  random v a r i a b l e ,  
The expected l o s s  of L(9, d ( X ) )  when 8 i s  t h e  t r u e  s t a t e  
of n a t u r e  is  c a l l e d  t h e  r i s k  func t ion ,  
which g i v e s  t h e  average l o s s  when 9 i s  t h e  t r u e  s t a t e  of n a t u r e  
and t h e  DM chooses d. 
For many purposes it i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  expecta- 
t i o n  a s  t h e  Rieman i n t e g r a l  
where F (x/9) i n d i c a t e s  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  func t ion  of t h e  random X 
v a r i a b l e  X,  given t h e  t r u e  s t a t e  of  n a t u r e  i s  8. 
The d e f i n i t i o n  of a  r i s k  func t ion  may be i n t e r p r e t e d  by a  
quote  from Ferguson (1967, p. 9 ) :  " I t  i s  a  custom, ..., t h a t  
t h e  choice  of a d e c i s i o n  func t ion  should depend only on t h e  
r i s k  f u n c t i o n  R ( 8 ,  d )  , ( t h e  s m a l l e r  t h e  va lue  t h e  b e t t e r )  and 
n o t  o therwise  on t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of t h e  random v a r i a b l e  
L (9, d  ( X )  ) . (For example, t h i s  would e n t a i l  t h e  suppos i t i on  
t h a t  a  poor man would be i n d i f f e r e n t  when choosing between t h e  
o f f e r  of $10,000 a s  an o u t r i g h t  g i f t ,  and t h e  o f f e r  of a gamble 
t h a t  would g ive  him $20,000 wi th  p r o b a b i l i t y  one h a l f  and $0 
wi th  p r o b a b i l i t y  one h a l f . ) "  Ferguson then  cont inues  i n  s t a t i n g  
t h a t  t h e r e  is good reason f o r  t h e  s t a t i s t i c i a n  o r  DM t o  behave 
t h i s  way, provided t h e  l o s s  i s  measured i n  t e r m s  of u t i l i t y .  
This  p o i n t  i s  n o t  f u r t h e r  e l a b o r a t e d  i n  t h e  book. Other 
s t a t i s t i c i a n s  do n o t  c a r e  a t  a l l  how t h e  l o s s  i s  measured, e.g. ,  
Mood and G r a y b i l l  (1963).  
I f  t h e  s t a t i s t i c i a n  i s  w i l l i n g  t o  assume a  p r i o r  d i s t r i b u -  
t i o n  over  t h e  parameter space H,  a s  it i s  done i n  Bayesian 
stat is t ics ,  t h e  Bayes r i s k  of a  d e c i s i o n  r u l e  i s  def ined  a s  t h e  
expec t a t i on  of t h e  r i s k  func t ion .  (The formal s t a t emen t  is 
somewhat more involved and w i l l  n o t  be  p re sen t ed  h e r e . )  
To summarize: 
1. The r i s k  f u n c t i o n  is  t h e  expected va lue  o f  t h e  l o s s  
f u n c t i o n  (no p r i o r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  assumed) 
2. The Bayes r i s k  i s  t h e  expec t a t i on  of t h e  r i s k  f u n c t i o n  
( p r i o r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  assumed). 
I f  t h e  DM chooses a  d e c i s i o n  r u l e  a s  t o  minimize r i s k ,  
h w i l l  minimize an expec t a t i on ,  i .e . ,  t h e  f i r s t  moment of  
t h e  l o s s  (o r  r i s k )  func t ion .  This  is fo rmal ly  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  
t h e  expected va lue  o r  expected u t i l i t y  p r i n c i p l e  t o  be 
d i s cus sed  i n  Sec t ion  3.3.  It must be kept  i n  mind t h a t  t h e  
e x p e c t a t i o n  i s  j u s t  a  r e a l  number. The whole s i t u a t i o n  is  
r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h i s  number i n  such a way t h a t  t h e  DM has  a 
prefe rence  o r d e r i n g  over  h i s  a c t i o n s  w i th  r e s p e c t  t o  t h a t  
number: minimize l o s s  ( o r  r i s k ) .  No s p e c i f i c  p sycho log ica l  
meaning is  a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  t e r m  " lo s s " .  The f a c t  t h a t  on ly  
l o s s  i s  cons idered  b u t  n o t  g a i n s  i s  on ly  induced by t h e  
problem formula t ion ,  f o r  methodological  convenience. 
3 .2 .  Risk i n  "Modern" U t i l i t y  - Theory 
"Modern" u t i l i t y  t heo ry  beg ins  w i t h  the p ionee r ing  work 
of one of  the g r e a t e s t  mathematicians of our  cen tu ry ,  John 
von Neumann, and w a s  l a i d  down i n  1944 i n  a  book e n t i t l e d  
"Theory of Games and Economic Behavior", by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern. Mostly t h e  second e d i t i o n ,  pub l i shed  i n  1 9 4 7 ,  
i s  r e f e r enced ,  because it con ta in s  t h e  p roofs  of t h e  theorems. 
La t e r  work by Savage (1954) ,  Luce and R a i f f a  (1957),  Fishburn 
(1964, 1970) ,  Keeney and R a i f f a  (1976) ,  and many o t h e r s ,  ha s  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  en r i ched  and r e f i n e d  the theory.  Th i s  k ind  of  
u t i l i t y  r e f e r s  t o  c o n d i t i o n s  of dec i s ion  making under un- 
c e r t a i n t y ,  as opposed t o  d e c i s i o n  making under c e r t a i n t y  o f  
t h e  (neo) classical economic school .  
I w i l l  n o t  t r y  t o  d e s c r i b e  what "modern u t i l i t y "  is, b u t  
w i l l  r i g h t  away d e s c r i b e  how r i s k  i s  handled w i t h i n  t h i s  frame- 
work. To be a b l e  t o  do s o ,  some formal  machinery i s  r equ i r ed .  
T h i s  w i l l  be in t roduced  f i r s t .  For a  sy s t ema t i c  i n t r o d u c t i o n  
i n t o  unidimensional  u t i l i t y  theory ,  t h e  r e a d e r s  may wish t o  
c o n s u l t  Chapter 4 of  Keeney and Ra i f f a .  W e  fo l l ow  t h e i r  
p r e s e n t a t i o n .  
A l o t t e r y ,  L,  i s  de f ined  as a p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
over  consequences (outcomes),  i . e . ,  t h e  l o t t e r y  y i e l d s  outcome 
x w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  pi, i = 1, 2 ,  ..., n. The (unce r t a in )  i 
consequences of  a  l o t t e r y  a r e  conceived as a  random v a r i a b l e  z. 
By d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  o p e r a t i o n ,  t h e  expected 
consequence is  given  by 
- -. 
and t h e  expec ted  u t i l i t y  by 
where u (x i )  deno t e s  t h e  u t i l i t y  a t t a c h e d  t o  outcome xi. I t  
i s  assumed t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker wishes t o  choose t h e  
l o t t e r y  which maximizes expec ted  u t i l i t y  ("EU-model" ) . 
A The c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  of a  l o t t e r y  i s  t h e  amount x  such 
A t h a t  t h e  DM i s  i n d i f f e r e n t  between L and t h e  s u r e - t h i n g  x  ( i .e . ,  
1/ t h e  p r o s p e c t  o f  g e t t i n g  amount x  f o r  c e r t a i n )  , i .e.,  6 -- L-- . 
A A The u t i l i t y  of x  i s  given  by u ( x ) ,  t h e  u t i l i t y  of  t h e  l o t t e r y  
i s  d e f i n e d  by i t s  expec ted  u t i l i t y  i n  Equ. (2), s o  w e  have: 
The c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  i s  a l s o  c a l l e d  ca sh  e q u i v a l e n t  and 
s e l l i n g  p r i c e  of L. 
Now w e  come t o  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of r i s k  ave r s ion .  Speaking 
i n t u i t i v e l y ,  a  pe r son  i s  r i s k  a v e r s e  i f  he  o r  she  i s  conserv- 
a t i v e ,  does n o t  l i k e  t o  gamble, etc.  I n  t h e  framework of  
u t i l i t y  t heo ry ,  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  p r e f e r r i n g  t h e  
expected consequence of  any nondegenerate l o t t e r y  L t o  L it- 
s e l f .  ( A  l o t t e r y  i s  c a l l e d  nondegenerate i f  no s i n g l e  
consequence has  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  one of occu r ing ,  a  su re -  
t h i n g  i s  t h e r e f o r e  a  degene ra t e  l o t t e r y . )  From t h i s  it 
fo l lows  d i r e c t l y  t h a t  t h e  u t i l i t y  o f  t h e  expec ted  consequence 
must be  g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h e  expec ted  u t i l i t y  o f  t h e  l o t t e r y ,  
a g a i n  v a l i d  f o r  a l l  nondegenerate  l o t t e r i e s ,  
An immediate consequence o f  t h a t  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a  
d e c i s i o n  maker is r i s k  a v e r s e  i f  and o n l y  i f  h i s  u t i l i t y  
f u n c t i o n  i s  concave; t h i s  theorem i s  ve ry  s imple  t o  prove 
 he s i g n  - i n d i c a t e s  i n d i f f e r e n c e ,  > (s t r ic t )  pre fe r ence ,  
and weak p r e f e r e n c e  ( p r e f e r e n c e - i n d i f f e r e n c e )  . Numerical 
r e l a t i o n s  a r e  denoted by > o r  2, a s  u sua l .  " I f f "  is used h e r e  t o  
deno t e  " i f  and on ly  i f " .  
(Keeney and R a i f f a ,  1976, p. 1 4 9 ) .  The DM i s  r i s k  prone i f  he 
p r e f e r s  any nondegenerate l o t t e r y  t o  t h e  expected consequence 
of t h a t  l o t t e r y .  The u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  of  such a DM i s  convex. 
F igu re  1 prov ides  an  example of a u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  o f  a 
A 
r i s k  a v e r s e  d e c i s i o n  maker. The c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  x i s  
s m a l l e r  t han  t h e  expec ted  consequence x of  L; t h i s  i s  g e n e r a l l y  
t r u e  f o r  a l l  r i s k  a v e r s e  DMs who have i n c r e a s i n g  u t i l i t y  
f u n c t i o n s  over  nondegenerate  l o t t e r i e s .  Obviously, t h e  DM i s  
c a u t i o u s  i n  t h e  s ense  t h a t  he i s  w i l l i n g  t o  g ive  up some 
amount a s  compared w i t h  t h e  expected consequence i n  o r d e r  t o  
g e t  a s m a l l e r  amount 4 f o r  s u r e .  The d i f f e r e n c e  between x and 
A 2/ 
x i s  c a l l e d  r i s k  premium (RP)- , 
RJ? (Z) = - A x - X  , (5) 
t h e  r i s k  premium e q u a l s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  expec ted  
consequence and c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t .  The RP i s  p o s i t i v e  f o r  
a r i s k  a v e r s e  DM, given  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i s  i n c r e a s i n g .  
U n t i l  now it was i m p l i c i t l y  assumed t h a t  t h e  xi w e r e  
p o s i t i v e ,  i .e . ,  p o t e n t i a l  ga ins .  Now t h e  DM could  b e  f aced  
w i t h  t h e  f r u s t r a t i n g  s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  a l l  t h e  x i ' s  were nega t i ve ,  
t h e  l o t t e r y  L- is a p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  ove r  losses (nega- 
t i v e  consequences) .  I n  such a s i t u a t i o n  a DM who is r i s k  
a v e r s e  would t r y  t o  g e t  r i d  of t h a t  l o t t e r y ,  he would be  
w i l l i n g  t o  pay a c e r t a i n  amount f o r  ach iev ing  t h a t  goa l .  The 
amount he would b e  w i l l i n g t o  pay t o  g e t  r i d  of t h e  l o t t e r y  is 
c a l l e d  i n su rance  premium ( I P ) ,  
t h a t  is ,  t h e  i n su rance  premium i s  t h e  nega t i ve  of t h e  c e r t a i n t y  
e q u i v a l e n t .  The DM would be  w i l l i n g  to  pay an " in su rance  
premium" of $ K i f  h i s  c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  f o r  l o t t e r y  L- i s  
-K. Grayson (19601, f o r  example, ana lyz ing  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  
( f o r  money) f o r  o i l  w i l d c a t t e r s  found s e v e r a l  pe rsons  e x h i b i t i n g  
convex u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s .  
1 ' ~ h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  of " r i s k  premium" d e v i a t e s  from t h a t  o f  
i n su rance  mathematics,  which u se s  t h e  t e r m  f o r  t h e  whole premium 
t o  be p a i d  f o r  g e t t i n g  t h e  i n su rance  c o n t r a c t .  
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FIGURE 1 
Example of  a  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  of a  r i s k  a v e r s e  DM 
The r i s k  premium of  a  l o t t e r y  l ( x l ,  p,  x2) e q u a l s  t h e  
t h e  expec ted  v a l u e  x of  t h a t  l o t t e r y ,  minus t h e  c e r t a i n t y  
A 
e q u i v a l e n t  x. The r i s k  premium i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  amount 
t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker i s  w i l l i n g  t o  g i v e  up from t h e  
expec ted  va lue  t o  avo id  t h e  r i s k  i n h e r e n t  i n  t h e  l o t t e r y .  
Let  m e  pause f o r  a  moment t o  p o i n t  o u t  some d i f f e r e n c e s  
between t h e  c l a s s i c a l  economis t ' s  " u t i l i t y "  f u n c t i o n  and t h e  
one de r ived  above. The " u t i l i t y "  f u n c t i o n  w i t h  d e c r e a s i n g  
marg ina l  u t i l i t y  ( e . g . ,  wi th  a  concave shape)  h a s  no measure- 
ment - theore t i c  de f ined  u n i t s .  A s  Keeney and R a i f f a  p o i n t  o u t  
c o r r e c t l y  (1976, p. 1 5 0 ) ,  such " u t i l i t y "  f u n c t i o n s  have no 
v a l i d  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i n  t e r m s  of  expected u t i l i t i e s - - a n y  such 
a s s e r t i o n s  a r e  meaningless.  Furthermore,  i n  my op in ion ,  it 
h a s  t o  be po in t ed  o u t  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  a  concave 
i n c r e a s i n g  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  a s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  a  r i s k  a v e r s e  DM 
i s  v a l i d  i f  and on ly  i f  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  was e s t a b l i s h e d  
by a  procedure  i nvo lv ing  t h e  e s t ab l i shmen t  o f  c e r t a i n t y  
e q u i v a l e n t s  f o r  l o t t e r i e s  ( o r  s i m i l a r  p rocedu re s ) ,  i . e . ,  f o r  
" r i s k y "  u t i l i t y  measurement procedures  ( s ee ,  e . g . ,  F i s c h e r ,  
1977) .  O r ,  i n  o t h e r  words, t h e  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  o f  u t i l i t y  
f u n c t i o n s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  r i s k  ave r se  o r  r i s k  prone DMs i s  v a l i d  
on ly  f o r  von Neumann-Morgernstern u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s ,  b u t  n o t  
f o r  t h e  c l a s s i c a l  econorhis t ' s  " u t i l i t y "  func t i on .  The n e x t  
few s e c t i o n s  d e a l  w i th  measures of r i s k  ave r s ion .  
Measures o f  Risk Aversion. A s  w e  j u s t  saw, von Neumann- 
Morgenstern u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  w i t h  a  concave shape i n d i c a t e  
r i s k  ave r s ion .  Now it would be n i c e  t o  be  a b l e  t o  e x p r e s s  t h e  
degree  of r i s k  ave r s ion .  Is t h e  degree of concaveness,  i .e . ,  
t h e  bend of  t h e  curve ,  a  v a l i d  i n d i c a t o r  of r i s k  ave r s ion?  I f  
t h i s  w e r e  t r u e ,  t h e  second d e r i v a t i v e  u" o f  u  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
x  should g ive  u s  t h e  in format ion  needed. But,  a s  shown by an  
example i n  Keeney and R a i f f a  (1976, p. 1 5 9 ) ,  t h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  
c a s e .  Two u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  may have d i f f e r e n t  second de r iva -  
t i o n s ,  b u t  do have t h e  same RP a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  them. But t h e  
s i g n  of  u" g i v e s  some in format ion ,  i f  u" i s  nega t i ve ,  t h e  s l o p e  
of t h e  curve  i s  concave and t h e  DM e x h i b i t s  r i s k  a v e r s i o n ,  i f  
u"  i s  p o s i t i v e ,  t h e  s l o p e  i s  convex and we conclude t h a t  t h e  
DM ho lds  a  r i s k  prone a t t i t u d e  toward cho i ce s  between l o t t e r i e s  
(it w i l l  be assumed throughout  t h a t  u  i s  t w i c e  con t inuous ly  
d i f f e r e n t i a b l e ) .  
Now, fo l lowing  P r a t t  (.1964), l o c a l  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  a t  x  i s  
de f ined  by 
i. e . , t h e  c u r v a t u r e  of  t h e  u t i l i t y  curve  a t  a  p o i n t  x  is  se t  
i n t o  p e r s p e c t i v e  t o  t h e  s l o p e .  
M u l t i v a r i a t e  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  w i l l  n o t  be t r e a t e d  h e r e ,  see, 
e - g . ,  S t i g l i t z  (1969) o r  Keeney (1973) .  
3 . 3 .  Risk i n  E a r l y  S o c i a l  Science  Exper imenta t ion 
It i s  b u t  r e c e n t l y  t h a t  " r i s k "  i s  a  r e s e a r c h  t o p i c  i n  t h e  
s o c i a l  s c i e n c e s .  Some of t h e  e a r l y  exper imenta l  work w i l l  be 
b r i e f l y  r e p o r t e d  now. The f i n d i n g s  o f  some of  t h e  exper iments  
l e d  t o  t h e  development of formal  t h e o r i e s  o f  r i s k ,  t o  be 
r e p o r t e d  i n  t h e  n e x t  c h a p t e r .  
Most of t h e  more r e c e n t  empi r i ca l  work t h a t  has  any r e l a -  
t i o n  t o  " r i s k "  was done i n  t h e  framework of behav io ra l  d e c i s i o n  
theo ry  (Edwards, 1954a, b ,  c ,  1961; Becker and McClintock, 1967; 
Rapoport and Walls ten,  1972; S lov ic ,  Fischhoff  and L i c h t e n s t e i n ,  
1977) .  A l l  of t h e s e  s t u d i e s  use  very  s imple  l o t t e r i e s ,  t o  be  
c a l l e d  "gambles" i n  t h e  seque l .  The " r i s k i n e s s "  was always 
de r ived  from p r e f e r e n t i a l  cho ice  d a t a ,  d i r e c t  e s t i m a t e s  of per- 
ce ived  r i s k i n e s s  w e r e  never  given d i r e c t l y  ( a s ,  f o r  example, 
i n  Huang's (1971) exper iments)  . Resu l t s  from t h e  two d i f f e r e n t  
response modes need no t  be i d e n t i c a l ,  of course .  Th i s  
whole i s s u e  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  o l d  deba te  of " revea led"  vs .  d i r e c t l y  
assessed  q u a n t i t i e s ,  see, e . g . ,  F i schhof f ,  e t  a l .  (1977) d i s -  
cus s ion  of S t a r r  (1969).  A s  long a s  t h e  expected va lue  of a  
l o t t e r y  i s  f i x e d  and t h e r e  i s  no skewness involved,  va r i ance  
remains t h e  main cand ida t e  f o r  p re fe rences .  Then, v a r i a n c e  i s  
i d e n t i f i e d  wi th  r i s k ,  s o  p re fe rences  a r e  based on r i s k  only .  
I f  more than  t h i s  one parameter v a r i e s ,  r e s u l t s  a r e  n o t  s o  
easy  t o  i n t e r p r e t .  
The most e lementary gamble g  i s  of t h e  fol lowing kind:  
t o  be read  a s  : Win amount r with  p r o b a b i l i t y  +, otherwise  W 
l o s e  rL (wi th  p r o b a b i l i t y  pL = 1 - +). Often = pL = 4. 
But sometimes t h e  l o t t e r i e s  have a  more complicated form. 
When people have t o  choose among such l o t t e r i e s ,  t o  what 
a s p e c t  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n  do they  r e a c t ?  
(1) People e x h i b i t  p r e fe rences  f o r  c e r t a i n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s ,  
e . g . ,  Edwards (1953, 1954a, b ,  c ) ;  
( 2 )  People e x h i b i t  p r e fe rences  f o r  c e r t a i n  l e v e l s  of 
va r i ance ,  e .g . ,  Coombs and P r u i t t  (19601. 
Which i s  more impor tan t?  According t o  Edwards ( 1 9 5 4 ~ ) ~  probabi l -  
i t y  p re fe rences  a r e  t h e  more important  of t h e  two. But i n  t h i s  
experiment p r o b a b i l i t y  and va r i ance  p re fe rences  were t o t a l l y  
confounded. R e s u l t s  of Davidson and Marschak (1959) and 
L i c h t e n s t e i n  (1965) i n d i c a t e  t h a t  va r i ance  p re fe rences  a r e  very 
impor tan t  i n  de te rmin ing  cho ices  between gambles. For  t h e i r  
p r e f e r r e d  l e v e l  o f  v a r i a n c e  - Ss  g ive  up a  cons ide rab le  amount 
of expected va lue .  
(3)  People e x h i b i t  p r e fe rences  f o r  skewness l e v e l s ,  
e . g . ,  Coombs and P r u i t t  (1960) and ~ i c h t e n s t e i n  
(1965),  wh i l e  
( 4 )  K u r t o s i s  p r e f e r e n c e s  could no t  be  e s t a b l i s h e d  
( L i c h t e n s t e i n ,  1965) .  
Problems a r i s e  i n  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  
some o f  t h e  s t u d i e s  mentioned s i n c e  v a r i o u s  f a c t o r s  do  n o t  
v a r y  independen t ly  o f  each  other--depending on t h e  d e s i g n  o f  
t h e  exper iment .  
Furthermore,  it must be s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  ( a lmos t )  no 
t h e o r e t i c a l  background behind t h e s e  s t u d i e s ,  a  f a c t  t h a t  h a s  
been c r i t i z e d  by Coombs (1972 ) ,  f o r  example. A l l  of them have 
r a t h e r  a  k ind  o f  e x p l a n a t o r y  c h a r a c t e r .  
P o i n t s  (2)  t o  ( 4 )  above were fo rmula ted  i n  t e r m s  of 
moments o f  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  There a r e  a l s o  some 
exper iments  which were conducted on t h e  components o f  t h e  
l o t t e r i e s ,  i . e . ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  t o  win and l o s e  (pW and pL) 
and t h e  amounts t o  win and l o s e  (rW and rL) . 
According t o  r e s u l t s  of S l o v i c  (1967) ,  S l o v i c  and Lichten-  
s t e i n  (1968) and Andr iessen (1971) , people  seem t o  p l a c e  more 
we igh t  on t h e  l o s e  components pL and rL t h a n  on t h e  win 
components. These r e s u l t s  w e r e  ob t a ined  by s imple  r e g r e s s i o n  
t e c h n i q u es ,  where t h e  wor th  o f  a  gamble i s  d e s c r i b e d  a s  a  
l i n e a r  combination of  t h e  components 
The B ' s  are j u s t  pa ramete r s  f i t t e d  by l e a s t  s q u a r e s ,  and t h e  
model is assumed, o r  superimposed. It i s  n o t  shown t h a t  S s  
a c t u a l l y  use  t h i s  i n f o r ma t ion  agg rega t i on  r u l e  which o b v i ~ u s l y  
d o e s  n o t  f o l l o w  SEU theory .  
Anderson and Shanteau (1970) took a  perhaps  more promis ing 
approach t o  t h e  same problem. I n s t e a d  o f  a  r e g r e s s i o n  paradigm, 
t h e s e  a u t h o r s  used a ANOVA des ign  w i t h  a  f u n c t i o n a l  measurement 
a n a l y s i s  (see Anderson, 1974 ) .  This  makes it p o s s i b l e  t o  t e s t  
more g e n e r a l  composi t ion  p r i n c i p l e s .  The components were t a k e n  
a s  s u b j e c t i v e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  and v a l u e s  
invo lved .  
Anderson and Shanteau found t h a t  a  m u l t i p l y i n g  model d i d  
q u i t e  a  good job a c r o s s  d i f f e r e n t  expe r imen t a l  s i t u a t i o n s ,  
w h i l e  t h e  add ing  model e x h i b i t e d  some more s e r i o u s  i nadequac i e s ,  
t h u s  c a s t i n g  some doubts  a s  t o  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  o f  a  
r e g r e s s i o n  f o r m u l a t i o n  of t h e  problem. 
I n  s o c i a l  psychology,  t h e  so - ca l l ed  " r i s k y  s h i f t "  phenomenon 
h a s  g a i n ed  g r e a t  a t t e n t i o n - - s e v e r a l  hundred pape r s  w e r e  pub l i she d  
on  it. Risky s h i f t  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n  f i r s t  r e p o r t e d  by 
S t o n e r  (1961) t h a t  groups  have t h e  tendency t o  p r e f e r  t o  a c c e p t  
r i s k i e r  o p t i o n s  t h a n  t h e  average  o f  t h e  group members. A 
d e t a i l e d  a n a l y s i s  of  t h a t  l i t e r a t u r e  from a  d e c i s i o n - t h e o r e t i c  
v iewpoin t  i s  given  i n  S chae fe r  (1978) . The main conc lu s ion  i s  
- t h a t  r i s k  i s  n o t  i n h e r e n t  i n  t h e  t a s k s  s u b j e c t s  have t o  do. 
There may be s h i f t s ,  b u t  n o t  on a  dimension t o  be c a l l e d  " r i s k " .  
Some very  i n s i g h t f u l  experiments on r i s k  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  
insurance  buying behavior  i n  a  l abo ra to ry  s e t t i n g  were per-  
formed by S lov ic  (1976). He o f f e r e d  s u b j e c t s  " f a i r "  insurance  
premiums (premium equa l  t o  t h e  expected l o s s )  f o r  v a r i o u s  
(pL, rL) combinations,  ranging  from ( . 0 0 1 ;  1 , 0 0 0 )  t o  ( .5 ;  2 ) ;  
r i n  d o l l a r s .  Typica l ly ,  s u b j e c t s  bought much more insurance L 
f o r  t h e  high probabi l i ty - low l o s s  event ,  t h e  maximum be ing  
about  70% f o r  a l l  o f f e r s  f o r  (.25; 4 ) .  Slov ic  then t e s t e d  
s e v e r a l  parameters.  So, f o r  example, i f  t h e  premium i s  sub- 
s i d i z e d ,  people buy a l i t t l e  more insurance ,  whi le  f o r  
commercial insurances  they  buy less. But t h e  gene ra l  p a t t e r n  
is  l e f t  unchanged. When t h e  s i t u a t i o n  was transformed i n t o  a  
more r e a l i s t i c  s e t t i n g  of a  "farm game", t h e  same p a t t e r n  
emerged aga in ,  a l though g e n e r a l l y  more insurance  was bought. 
These f i n d i n g s  are h igh ly  i n t e r e s t i n g  and c o n t r a r y  t o  what 
one might have p red ic t ed .  While i n  t h e  pub l i c  d i scuss ion  "low 
probabi l i ty -h igh  consequence" even t s  p lay  a  dominant r o l e  to -  
day--people organize  i n t o  committees, p r o t e s t  on t h e  streets 
a g a i n s t  o p t i o n s  wi th  such c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  e .g . ,  nuc lea r  f u e l e d  
power s t a t i o n s ,  etc. , t h e  same ( ? )  people a r e  obviously  n o t  
w i l l i n g  t o  i n s u r e  themselves a g a i n s t  even t s  which e f f e c t  them 
perhaps even more d i r e c t l y ,  such a s  f loods  o r  ear thquakes .  
S lov ic  proposes two p o s s i b l e  exp lana t ions  f o r  h i s  f i nd ings .  
F i r s t ,  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  may be convex over  l o s s e s .  i n -  
s t e a d  of concaveas  i s  normally assumed. Such a  f u n c t i o n a l  
form would i n d i c a t e  d imin ish ing  marginal  d i s u t i l i t y  over  
l o s s e s ,  Convex u t i l i t y  curves  w e r e  a c t u a l l y  found i n  some 
s t u d i e s ,  e .g . ,  by Ga lan te r  (1975, Galan te r  and P l i n e r  C19741, 
Swalm (1966),  and Tversky and Kahnemann C1975), and t h e  above 
mentioned work by Grayson. A convex u t i l i t y  func t ion  would 
i m p l y , t a k i n g  SEU theo ry  f o r  g ran ted ,  t h a t  nobody buys insurance.  
The second exp lana t ion  i s  a th re sho ld  model f o r  t h e  probabi l -  
i t i e s  involved: If t h e y  a r e  t o o  smal l ,  i . e . ,  below a c e r t a i n  
t h r e s h o l d ,  t hey  are ignored ,  People j u s t  a c t  a s  i f  " t h a t  could 
n o t  happen" t o  them. Anyway, bo th  of S l o v i c ' s  exp lana t ions  a r e  
i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  SEU theory .  
S lov ic  a l s o  thought  about  ways of how t o  se l l  insurances ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  t o  people i n  a r e a s  menaced by n a t u r a l  hazards ,  such 
a s  f loods  and ear thquakes .  One p o s s i b i l i t y  would be t o  se l l  
insurances  i n  form of a  "package", i n s u r i n g  a g a i n s t  t h e  pre- 
f e r r e d  high probabi l i ty - low consequence even t s ,  b u t  a l s o  t o  
some e x t e n t  a g a i n s t  t h e  r u i n  combination of low p r o b a b i l i t y -  
high consequence even t s .  This  could be coupled wi th  o t h e r  
measures, such  a s  reimbursement of a  p a r t  of t h e  premium i f  
"nothing happened". Furthermore, t h e  t i m e  hor izon  f o r  t h e  
insurance plan might be  important:  I f  t h e  r u i n  p r o b a b i l i t y  is  
computed f o r ,  say ,  a  t ime per iod of 20 yea r s  i n  some r e s i d e n t i a l  
a r e a ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  higher  as compared t o  a 
r e fe rence  time of a  year .  With t h i s  l i t t l e  t r i c k ,  t h e  th re sho ld  
may be overcome. 
4 .  FORMAL THEORIES OF RISK AND RISK PREFERENCE 
4 . 1 .  Why Formal Theories? What A r e  Formal Theories? 
Formal t h e o r i e s  o f f e r  some advantages over pu re ly  v e r b a l l y  
formulated t h e o r i e s .  One obvious advantage is p r e c i s i o n :  Formal 
t h e o r i e s  are based on a set of assumptions (axioms) from which 
consequences a r e  deduced i n  a  mathematical way. I f  t h e  r e a l  
d a t a  f u l f i l l  t h e  axioms, o f t e n  r a t h e r  s t r o n g  s t a t emen t s  can be 
made. The axioms should be s t a t e d  such t h a t  they  make sense 
and a r e  t e s t a b l e ,  though it w i l l  n o t  always be p o s s i b l e  t o  t e s t  
a l l  of them (Adams, Fagot,  and Robinson, 1970) .  Since c e r t a i n  
s t r u c t u r a l  r e l a t i o n s  a r e  involved i n  most of t h e  axioms, t h e  
f a i l u r e  t o  f u l f i l l  them w i l l  c a s t  l i g h t  on what may be wrong. 
I t  might then be poss ib l e  t o  weaken t h e  axioms (a t  t h e  expense 
of l e s s  in format ive  conclusions)  o r  t o  re-formulate them. 
The t h e o r i e s  we w i l l  have t o  consider  belong t o  t h e  domain 
of t h e  axiomatic theory  of measurement (Krantz, Luce, Suppes 
and Tversky, 1971).  Very gene ra l ly ,  axiomatic t h e o r i e s  pro- 
cede a s  follows.  A person has  t o  make a  s e t  of judgments o r  
dec i s ions .  Usually t h e  judgments a r e  o r d i n a l  ones ,  e .g . ,  t h e  
judgment "rod a  is longer  than rod b" .  The goal  o f  measure- 
ment c o n s i s t s  i n  mapping some of t h e  f e a t u r e s  t h a t  hold t r u e  i n  
t h e  empi r i ca l  world i n t o  numbers, such t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
which govern t h e  empi r i ca l  world ( t h e  l eng th  of a  set  of rods ,  
f o r  example) a r e  f a i t h f u l l y  mapped i n t o  numbers. 
More formal ly ,  a  mqasurement procedure c o n s i s t s  of t h e  
fol lowing two s t e p s :  
(1) Representat ion theorem: A mapping from an empi r i ca l  
r e l a t i o n a l  system i n t o  a  numerical one is  cons t ruc t ed  which i s  
a t  l e a s t  a  homomorphism. A r e l a t i o n a l  system i s  a set t o g e t h e r  
wi th  one o r  more r e l a t i o n s  def ined  on t h e  elements of  t h e  s e t .  
Le t  A be a  s e t  of elements of value and a  b ina ry  r e l a t i o n  It 6 11 
i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  " i s  n o t  p r e f e r r e d  t o " ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n a l  system i s  
then given by 4, &> . Thus a  b ,  b  A,  means t h a t  a i s  
n o t  p r e f e r r e d  t o  b. The corresponding numerical r e l a t i o n a l  
system might be IR , t h e  r e a l s ,  t oge the r  wi th  t h e  r e l a t i o n  "I", 
"no t  g r e a t e r  than".  Again, very loose ly ,  t h e  homomorphism 
s t a t e s  t h a t  i f  a  b i n  t h e  empir ica l  r e l a t i o n a l  system holds  
t r u e ,  then a l s o  a  I b i n  t h e  r e a l s .  A homomorphism is  a mapping 
which p re se rves  t h e  s t r u c t u r e .  
(2)  Uniqueness theorem. The un iqueness  theorem d e f i n e s  
what o t h e r  homomorphisms a r e  a l s o  pe rmi t t ed ,  by which t h e  s c a l e  
q u a l i t y  of  t h e  measurement i s  d e f i n e d ,  e . g . ,  semiorder ,  i n t e r -  
v a l  s c a l e ,  r a t i o  s c a l e .  
The whole sys tem h a s  t h e  advantage t h a t  t h e  r e sponse s  o f  
a  pe r son  a r e  n o t  g i v en  on a s c a l e  t h e  q u a l i t y  of  which i s  
s t a t e d  by t h e  ex p e r i m en t e r  (e .g.,  i n t e r v a l  s c a l e  f o r  r a t i n g s )  , 
r a t h e r ,  t h e  s c a l e  q u a l i t y  i s  d e r i v e d  and can  be t aken  f o r  
g r a n t e d ,  once t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  m e t .  Furthermore,  it i s  
i m p o r t a n t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  i n  many such p rocedures  t h a t  have  a 
measurement- theore t ic  f o u n da t i on ,  on ly  responses  on a n  o r d i n a l  
s c a l e  a r e  r e q u i r e d ,  such a s  "app le  a  i s  n o t  h e a v i e r  t h a n  
a p p l e  b" .  Th i s  t a s k  shou ld  be  ve ry  ea sy  f o r  judges.  Only 
p rocedures  w i t h  a  measurement- theore t ic  founda t ion  can  gua ran t ee  
t h a t  one r e a l l y  knows t h e  s c a l e  q u a l i t y ,  which i s  one o f  t h e  
e s s e n t i a l s  of measurement. A s h o r t  g l ance  i n  t h e  above- 
mentioned book by Krantz ,  e t  a l . ,  w i l l  convince  t h a t  t h e  
a c t u a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n  of t h e o r i e s  w i th  an  ax iomat ic  measurement- 
t h e o r e t i c  f o u n d a t i o n  i s  by no means a t r i v i a l i t y .  
Perhaps  one  shou ld  add some s c e p t i c a l  remarks on t h e  va lue  
of a x i o m a t i c  t h e o r i e s  o f  measurement. F i r s t ,  n o t  a l l  assump- 
t i o n s  (axioms) a r e  r e a l l y  t e s t a b l e .  Th i s  i s  g e n e r a l l y  t r u e  f o r  
s t r u c t u r a l  assumpt ions ,  l i k e  t h e  Archimedean, b u t  a l s o ,  though 
t o  a  lesser e x t e n t ,  f o r  independence assulnptions ( s ee ,  e . q . ,  
von W i n t e r f e l d t ,  1 9 7 6 ) .  Second, i f  t h e r e  i s  on ly  a s i n g l e  
v i o l a t i o n ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s ,  s t r i c t l y  speak ing ,  no r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  
O r ,  i n  o t h e r  words, t h e r e  i s  no developed t h e o r y  of measure- 
ment e r r o r s .  Elements  o f  such a t h e o r y  a r e  promised f o r  t h e  
second volume of t h e  Kran tz ,  e t  al . ,  book. A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  one 
cou ld  c o n s i d e r  t o  c o n s t r u c t  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  ax ioma t i c  t h e o r i e s  
of measurement, a s  proposed by Domoter (1969) .  But t h e  
development of such t h e o r i e s  i s  n o t  t o o  s a t i s f a c t o r y  y e t .  
Th i rd ,  a  p r a c t i c a l  d i s ad v an t age  i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  o f t e n  ve ry  
many judgments are r e q u i r e d ,  some of which Bay b e  r a t h e r  
a r t i f i c i a l  o r  h y p o t h e t i c a l .  Neve r the l e s s ,  t h e  development of 
a x i o m a t i c  t h e o r i e s  f o r  t h e  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e s  i s  a v e r y  impor t an t  
c o n t r i b u t i o n ,  because  o f  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  s t a t u s  o f  a  s c i e n c e  
c a n  b e  b e s t  a s s e s s e d  from t h e  s t a t u s  o f  t h e  development of i t s  
measurement t h e o r y ,  o r  t h e o r i e s  (and t e chn iques ,  of  c o u r s e ) .  
4.2. Risk P e r c e p t i o n ,  Risk P r e f e r e n c e ,  and Risk Management 
The d i s t i n c t i o n  mentioned i n  t h e  head ing  is  obv ious ,  
though o f t e n  over looked  o r  a t  least surrounded w i t h  some 
" f u z z i n e s s " .  C r e d i t  must b e  g iven  t o  Clyde Coombs who, i n  a l l  
h i s  w r i t i n g s ,  was always v e r y  c l e a r  on t h a t  i s s u e .  Risk  r e f e r s  
t o  t h e  r i s k i n e s s  of  an  o p t i o n .  ~t i s  a m a t t e r  o f  p e r c e p t i o n ,  
o r  e s t i m a t i o n .  The measurement of r i s k ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i nduces  an  
o r d e r  r e l a t i o n  on r i s k  e s t i m a t e s .  These d imensions  are i n -  
dependent  o f  e ach  o t h e r .  Risk p r e f e r e n c e ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, 
s imply  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  amount o f  r i s k  you l i k e ;  do you p r e f e r  t o  
gamble o r  t o  b e  on t h e  s a f e  s i d e ?  More s p e c i f i c a l l y :  What 
amount of r i s k  do you l i k e  b e s t ?  Th is  i s  a  q u e s t i o n  of  r i s k  
e v a l u a t i o n ;  r i s k  p r e f e r ence  induces  a n  o r d e r  r e l a t i o n  on r i s k  
e v a l u a t i o n .  Two persons  may very  w e l l  ag r ee  on t h e  r i s k i n e s s  
of  a  s e t  of gambles, b u t  may n e v e r t h e l e s s  p r e f e r  d i f f e r e n t  
gambles, rank-order  them d i f f e r e n t l y  accord ing  t o  t h e i r  pe r s -  
o n a l  p r e f e r en ce .  Th i s  i s  n o t  t o  s ay  t h a t  people shou ld  ag re e  
on r i s k i n e s s  of  o p t i o n s .  A f t e r  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i ~ n  w a s  made, it  
s e e m s e v i d e n t t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  t h e o r i e s  f o r  bo th  a s p e c t s ,  
r i s k  p r e f e r en ce  and r i s k  ( e s t i m a t i o n ) .  Otway (1977) i n t r o -  
duces  a  t h i r d  a s p e c t ,  r i s k  management, which r e f e r s  t o  t h e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  and p o l i t i c a l  hand l ing  of r i s k y  o p t i o n s .  T h i s  
l a t t e r  a s p e c t  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  r e l e v a n t  f o r  r i s k s  t h a t  a f f e c t  
s o c i e t y ,  such a s  t h e  r i s k s  of  v a r i o u s  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  models,  
of  energy sys tems,  and l a r g e - s c a l e  technology i n  g e n e r a l .  
4.3. Theor ies  o f  Risk 
4.3.1. Polynomial  Psychophysics o f  Risk (Coombs and Huanq) 
The f i r s t  formal  t heo ry  of a s t r u c t u r e  o f  pe r ce ived  r i s k  
was proposed and t e s t e d  by Coombs and Huang (-1970). The 
t h e o r y  d e a l s  w i t h  t h r e e  t r an s fo rma t ions  of  s imple  gambles of 
t h e  k i n d  ( W ,  p ,  L) w i t h  p  = 4 and W > L, t h a t  i s ,  gambles w i t h  
p o s i t i v e  expec ted  va lues .  
The t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s  used were of t h e  fo l lowing  k ind :  
T h i s  t r an s f o r m a t i o n  h a s  t h e  p r o p e r t y  t h a t  a l l  p o s s i b l e  determ- 
i n a n t s  o f  " r i s k " ,  such a s  v a r i a n c e ,  maximal l o s s ,  expec ted  l o s s ,  
expec ted  r e g r e t ,  i n c r e a s e  w i t h  a. One cou ld  e x p e c t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
t h a t  p e r ce i v ed  r i s k  of a ( g )  i s  a monotonical ly  i n c r e a s i n g  
f u n c t i o n  of a .  
( b )  b ( g )  ( W +  b ,  p ,  L +  b )  ; E [ b ( g ) ] =  E [g] + b. ( 9 )  
Trans format ion  b ( g )  has  no e f f e c t  on t h e  va r i ance  o r  on ex- 
p e c t ed  r e g r e t ,  b u t  changes t h e  maximal l o s s  and t h e  expec t ed  
l o s s ,  which covary  i n v e r s e l y  w i t h  b. The expec ted  v a l u e  
i n c r e a s e s  by amount b. 
(c )  c ( g )  ( W ,  p, LIC , i . e . ,  g  i s  played c t i m e s  independen t ly  
E [c (g)] = c E [g] . (10) 
T h i s  t r an s f o r m a t i o n  c ( g )  i s  a convo lu t i on  of g  w i t h  i t s e l f .  
It was p o s t u l a t e d  t h a t  pe rce ived  r i s k  R would fo l l ow  a 
d i s t r i b u t i v e  c o n j o i n t  measurement model, 
where a, B and y a r e  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  cor respondan ts  t o  a ,  b  and 
c .  The model was t e s t e d  by a  c o n j o i n t  measurement a n a l y s i s .  
4.3.2. P o l l a t s e k  and Tversky ' s  Risk Systems 
L e t  u s  n e x t  c o n s i d e r  t h e  P o l l a t s e k  and Tversky (1970) 
r i s k  t h e o r y  i n  s o m e  more d e t a i l .  On t h e  b a s i s  of some assump- 
t i o n  on t h e  o r d e r i n g s  o f  pe r ce ived  r i s k  a  r a t i o  s c a l e  of  r i s k  
is de r ived .  F i r s t ,  a  fo rmal  s t a t emen t  of t h e  t h e o r y  w i l l  Be 
g iven ,  t o  be  fo l lowed  by some i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and c r o s s  r e f -  
e r e n c e s .  
D e f i n i t i o n s  
S  = {A, B ,  C ,  . . . I  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o v e r  IR 
convo lu t i on  of  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s ,  
i . e . ,  i f  two l o t t e r i e s  a r e  g iven  by 
A = (a l ,  pl; a 2 ,  p2)  and 
= ( b l r  ql; b2 t  92)  t t h e n  
b i n a r y  r e l a t i o n  of comparat ive  r i s k  
"A k B" ,  i s  t o  be  r e a d  a s  "A is  a t  l e a s t  
a s  r i s k y  a s  B" 
t h e  n u l l  gamble: a  v a l u e  of  z e r o  i s  
o b t a i n e d  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  one 
The r e l a t i o n a l  sys tem e, o ,  &> i s  a  r i s k  sys tem i f  t h e  
axioms o f  e x t e n s i v e  meas rement (weak o r d e r ,  c a n c e l l a t i o n  
( mono ton i c i t y ) ,  s o l v a b i l i t y ,  Archimedean) a r e  f u l f i l l e d .  The 
convo lu t i on  o p e r a t i o n  as  d e f i n e d  above i s  r a t h e r  s i m i l a r  t o  
t h e  convo lu t i on  o p e r a t i o n  i n  l e n g t h  measurement. 
What do  t h e  axioms impose on t h e  judgments? The f i r s t  
axiom s t a t e s  t h e  c o m p a r a b i l i t y  of  a l l  l o t t e r i e s ,  and t h e i r  
t r a n s i t i v e  o r d e r ;  t h e  second t h e  c o m p a t a b i l i t y  w i t h  t h e  
convo lu t i on  o p e r a t i o n .  The t h i r d  and f o u r t h  a r e  t e c h n i c a l  
axioms a s  t h e y  a r e  t y p i c a l l y  used  i n  t h e  ax iomat ic  t h e o r y  o f  
measurement; t h e y  a r e  n o t  t e s t a b l e ,  whereas t h e  f i r s t  two a r e  
t e s t a b l e .  
A s  s t a t e d  i n  4 . 1 . ,  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  theorem i s  the c o r e  
of any measurement t h e o r y .  It r e a d s  a s  fo l lows :  I f  A 1  - A4 
a r e  f u l f i l l e d ,  t h e n  it i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  c o n s t r u c t  an  a d d i t i v e  
r a t i o  s c a l e  which p r e s e r v e s  t h e  r i s k  o r d e r .  I f  <s, o ,  h> 
is a  r i s k  sys tem,  t h e n  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  r e a l -va lued  f u n c f i o n  R, 
d e f i n e d  on S f  such t h a t  f o r  a r b i t r a r y  A, B,  € S :  
i) A & B i f f  R C A )  2 R(B) 
ii) R ( A 0  B) = R(A) + R ( B )  
iii) I f  R '  i s  an o t he r  f u n c t i o n  f u l f i l l i n g  i) and ii), then  
R 1 ( A )  = aR(A) f o r  c e r t a i n  a > 0; (iii) g i v e s  t h e  
un iqueness  c o n d i t i o n .  
The approach t ak en  by P o l l a t s e k  and Tversky i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  
a n  e x t e n s i v e  measurement s t r u c t u r e .  But i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  o t h e r  
such s t r u c t u r e s ,  t h e  r i s k  s c a l e  can  t a k e  on n e g a t i v e  va lue s .  
Th i s  i s  n o t  a s  unreasonab le  as one might  f i r s t  t h i n k ,  s i n c e  a 
c o n v o lu t i o n  o f  two l o t t e r i e s  A and B may be pe r ce ived  t o  b e  
less r i s k y  t h a n  A and B t aken  a lone .  I n t u i t i v e l y ,  however, a  
n e g a t i v e  r i s k  i s  n o t  a  ve ry  appea l i ng  no t i on .  
A f u r t h e r  consequence of  t h e  assumption i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
a s u r e - t h i n g  need n o t  have a  r i s k  va lue  o f  z e r o  a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  it. A su r e - t h i n g  of  amount z e r o  h a s  a  r i s k  o f  z e r o ,  a  
p o s i t i v e  amount h a s  a  n ega t i ve  r i s k ,  and v i c e  v e r s a .  Th i s  may 
n o t  b e  a  v e r y  ap p ea l i n g  p r o p e r t y  o f  a  r i s k  measure, too .  It 
might  b e  i n s t r u c t i v e  t o  go through a  l i t t l e  example: L o t t e r y  
A = (200, +, -200) is  judged t o  b e  r i s k i e r  t h a n  B = (300, 4, 
-100) by most people .  But B was gene ra t ed  by t h e  a d d i t i o n  of  
a s u r e - t h i n g  o f  100 t o  A. There fore ,  t h e r e  must b e  a  n e g a t i v e  
r i s k  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  o p t i o n  t o  g e t  $100 f o r  s u r e .  T h i s  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  m o t i v a t e s  t h e  fo l l owing  axiom: 
A5: P o s i t i v i t y ,  i f  K is  a  degenera ted  l o t t e r y  w i t h  k  > 0 ,  
k €  K ,  t h en :  A b A o k  f o r  a l l  A i n  S. 
To come t o  even s t r o n g e r  consequences,  some more axioms have 
t o  be i n t r o d u ced :  
A6: Monotonic i ty ,  f o r  a l l  A, B € S w i t h  E [A] = E [B] = 0 
and f o r  a r b i t r a r y  t € R l, t > 1, 
i) t~ ) A 
ii) A b B i f f  t A  h t B  . 
Axiom 6 t e l l s  u s  t h a t  r i s k  i n c r e a s e s  f o r  l o t t e r i e s  w i t h  z e r o  
e x p e c t ed  v a l u e ,  i f  t h ey  a r e  m u l t i p l i e d  by a  p o s i t i v e  c o n s t a n t ,  
and t h a t  t h e  r i s k  o r d e r  i s  prese rved  under m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  w i t h  
a  p o s i t i v e  c o n s t a n t .  (i) i s  s i m i l a r  t o  an  ad hoc assumpt ion 
on r i s k  used by Coombs: The throw of  a  c o i n  w i t h  a  h i g h e r  
denomination is more r i s k y  than  t h e  throw of a  c o i n  w i t h  lower 
denomination (Coombs used on ly  a  weak r e l a t i o n s h i p ) ,  and (ii) 
s a y s  t h a t  t h e  r i s k  o r d e r  i s  independent  of  t h e  denominat ion of  
t h e  c o i n .  A6 imposes a  q u i t e  s t r o n g  b e h a v i o r a l  assumpt ion,  
which can  be t e s t e d ,  of  cou r se .  
A7: C o n t i n u i t y ,  a  p u r e l y  t e c h n i c a l  axiom which is  n o t  
b e h a v i o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t .  
A r e l a t i o n a l  sys tem f u l f i l l i n g  t h e  axioms of  e x t e n s i v e  
measurement and i n  a d d i t i o n  axioms A5 t o  A7 i s  c a l l e d  a 
r e g u l a r  r i s k  system. The a n a l y s i s  o f  such a sys tem l e a d s  
t o  an i m p o r t an t  theorem: I f  < S t  o ,  &> i s  a r e g u l a r  
r i s k  system, t h e n  t h e r e  i s  one and on l?  one  8, 0 < 8 I 1, 
such t h a t  f o r  a l l  A ,  B i n  S (wi th  f i n i t e  expec t ed  v a l u e  
and v a r i a n c e ) :  
A h B i f f  R ( A )  2 R ( B )  , wi th  R ( A )  = 8 V[A] - (1-8) E [A]. 
This  v e r y  a s t o n i s h i n g  r e s u l t  t e l l s  us  t h a t  i n  a  r e g u l a r  
r i s k  system a r i s k  o r d e r i n g  i s  gene ra t ed  by a l i n e a r  combination 
of  expec ted  v a l u e  and v a r i a n c e ,  i . e . ,  t h e  pe r ce ived  r i s k i n e s s  
of  a  l o t t e r y  depends o n l y  on t h e  expec ted  v a l u e  and t h e  v a r i a n c e  
and on a s i n g l e  pa ramete r ,  8, which i s  person s p e c i f i c ,  o f  
c o u r s e .  The v a l u e  o f  8 can  e a s i l y  be d e r i v e d  from some judg- 
ments  on r i s k - e q u i v a l e n c e  between l o t t e r i e s .  The v a l u e  of 8 
d e f i n e s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  expec t ed  v a l u e  and of  
t h e  v a r i a n c e  t o  t h e  p e r ce i ved  r i s k i n e s s  of  a  l o t t e r y ,  i . e . ,  it 
c a p t u r e s  a  va r iance-expec ted  va lue  t r ade -o f f  ("VE-theory") .  
From t h e  e a r l y  d e f i n i t i o n s  (see 2 . )  it was e v i d e n t  t h a t  many 
a u t h o r s  viewed t h e  v a r i a n c e  a s  t h e  s i n g l e  most impor t an t  f a c t o r  
i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  r i s k  o f  an  o p t i o n .  But it i s  a l s o  e v i d e n t  
t h a t  t h e  ex p ec t ed  v a l u e  h a s  t o  p l a y  a r o l e .  Now, bo th  of  t h e s e  
c o n t r i b u t i n g  f a c t o r s  a r e  c a p t u r e d  i n  a  ve ry  s imple  formula .  
A s  w i l l  be n o t ed ,  a  f u r t h e r  p o s s i b l e  c a n d i d a t e ,  skewness, i s  
n o t  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n t o  t h e  theory .  
From a set of axioms, none of  which seems t o  be r e a l l y  
c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e ,  some v e r y  s t r o n g  consequences have been 
deduced. The most i m p o r t an t  i s  theorem 2 ,  g i v i n g  r i s k  a s  
b e i n g  g e n e r a t ed  by a l i n e a r  combination o f  expec ted  v a l u e  and 
v a r i a n c e .  Some o t h e r  a s p e c t s  a r e  a l s o  worth be ing  r e s t a t e d ,  
such a s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  a  n e g a t i v e  r i s k  and a non-zero 
r i s k  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a  su r e - t h ing .  These a s p e c t s  might  prove 
v e r y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e m p i r i c a l l y  f u l f i l l  t h e  t heo ry .  
A f u r t h e r  p r o p e r t y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h i s  r i s k  t h e o r y  c a n  be  
s t a t e d  as f o l l o w s :  Define a p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r  t h a t  depends o n l y  
on  e x p e c t a t i o n  and v a r i a n c e  a s  VE-dependent, i f  f o r  any two 
l o t t e r i e s  L and g 
V ( L )  = V(gl and E ( L )  = E ( . g )  -. L w g  
A p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r  i s  dependent  on a (Po l la t sek-Tversky)  r i s k  
measure, o r  R-dependent, whenever 
and 
Any p re fe r ence  o r d e r  t h a t  i s  R-dependent i s  a l s o  VE-dependent, 
b u t  n o t  conversely .  I f  u t i l i t y  can be expressed a s  a  power 
s e r i e s  i n  money, t hen  t h e r e  is  no u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  which i s  
compat ible  w i t h  a  p r e f e r ence  o r d e r  t h a t  depends on ly  on t h e  
r i s k  measure, and on ly  t h e  q u a d r a t i c  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i s  
compat ible  w i t h  a  VE-dependent p r e f e r ence  o rde r .  A s  Krantz,  
e t  a l .  (1971) p o i n t  o u t  f u r t h e r ,  t h i s  nega t ive  r e s u l t  c an  be 
t aken  a s  evidence a g a i n s t  P o l l a t s e k  and Tversky 's  r i s k  system 
o r  a g a i n s t  expected u t i l i t y  theory .  A s  a consequence, a s  it 
appears  t o  m e  a  t heo ry  of r i s k  must be def ined  such t h a t  more 
s a t i s f a c t o r y  p re f e r ence  o r d e r s  a r e  compatible wi th  it. 
4.3.3. Huana's Theory of  E x ~ e c t e d  Risk 
Huang (1971a) proposed a  theory  of r i s k  i n  which " r i s k "  is  
de f ined  as expected r i s k  ( E R ) :  
i n  which 
f  denotes  a  real valued f u n c t i o n  on X ,  t h e  r i s k  
func t ion ,  
S X  i s  an  outcome, o r  consequence, 
P i s  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  measure on X ,  
X is t h e  set of a l l  p o s s i b l e  outcomes. 
A l o t t e r y  o r  gamble gl is  s u b j e c t i v e l y  n o t  more r i s k y  
t han  g2 ,  g l d  g2 ,  i f  t h e  fo l lowing  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  f u l f i l l e d :  
cC g1 - g2 iff r ( g l )  2 r ( .g2)  iff T P l i  f.(.xli) s Z P2i f(xZi)  . 
1 i 
L o t t e r y  g2 i s  no more r i s k y  t han  gl i f f  t h e  r i s k  v a l u e  of gl 
i s  less o r  e q u a l  t o  t h a t  o f  g2 ,  which i s  the  case i f f  t h e  
weighted sum of  t h e  r i s k  v a l u e s  of t h e  outcomes, i .e., f (xi) 
of  g1 i s  n o t  g r e a t e r  t han  t h a t  of  g2. The weights  a r e  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  o f  occurrance,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  r i s k  f u n c t i o n  i s  
c a l l e d  expected r i s k  ( f u n c t i o n ) .  
The axioms used t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h i s  r e s u l t  a r e  e s s e n t i a l l y  
t h o s e  of Fishburn (1970, Ch. 8.4.) f o r  an  expected u t i l i t y  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  which a r e  based on mixture  sets. Huang's 
uniqueness  theorem states t h a t  t h e  expected r i s k  f u n c t i o n  i s  
a n  i n t e r v a l  scale. 
Expected r i s k  theory  is  ve ry  s i m i l a r  t o  (S)EU theory ;  
t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  component i s  t h e  same, b u t  u(xi) i s  r ep l aced  
by f  ( x i ) .  Expected u t i l i t y  f o r  d i s c r e t e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u -  
t i o n s  can  be  w r i t t e n  as: 
where R deno te s  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of  a " r i s k n  f a c t o r  which r e l a t e s  
t h e  EV t o  t h e  EU. 
A s  was shown l a t e r  by Huang (1974) , E U  t heo ry  i s  a 
s p e c i a l  case of t h e  expec ted  r i s k  theory .  Fur thermore ,  a s  one 
might  have expec ted ,  EU t heo ry  is  a s p e c i a l  c a s e  of t h e  
P o r t f o l i o  t h e o r y  o f  Coornbs (1967) ,  where t h e  DM p r e f e r s  e i t h e r  
minimal o r  maximal l e v e l s  of  r i s k ,  b u t  no th ing  i n  between. 
Expected u t i l i t y  t h e o r y  is u s u a l l y  cons ide red  t o  be  " t h e "  
normative t h e o r y  o f  d e c i s i o n  making under u n c e r t a i n t y .  Coombs 
(1972, p. 2 )  w r i t e s  i n  t h i s  con t ex t :  "Indeed t h e  n o t i o n  o f  
maximizing expec ted  u t i l i t y  made t h e  n o t i o n  of  r i s k  super-  
f luous .  The ax iorna t iza t ion  of u t i l i t y ,  f i r s t  by von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1947) ,  o n l y  s t r eng thened  t h i s  view". I n  
modern and s o p h i s t i c a t e d  t e x t s  on u t i l i t y  t heo ry ,  such a s  
Fishburn (1964, 1 9 7 0 ) ,  t h e  t e r m  r i s k  is n o t  even mentioned i n  
t h e  index  though t h e  books are w e l l  indexed.  Coombs concludes:  
"Such t h e o r i e s  s imply avo id  t h e  p sycho log i ca l  r e a l i t y "  ( l oc .  
t !  Thc3ziz3 of r i s k  are designed t o  b e  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  and 
maybe p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  m o r e  adequate ,  f o r m a l i z a t i o n s  o f  d e c i s i o n  
making under  u n c e r t a i n t y .  
4 . 3 . 4 .  Some Empir ' ica l  R e s u l t s  
Coombs and Huang (-1970b) t e s t e d  their  own polynomial  
r i s k  t heo ry .  Some of  t h e  r e s u l t s  can  be summarized a s  
fo l lows  : 
( a )  Perce ived  r i s k  i n c r e a s e d  w i th  i n c r e a s e  of a i n  
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  (1); 20 o u t  o f  28 - Ss.  
(b) Perce ived  r i s k  decreased  w i th  i n c r e a s e  o f  b i n  
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  (.2); 26 o u t  o f  28 Ss. 
- 
(c)  Parameter  c acts a s  an  " a m p l i f i e r " ,  a s  assumed 
by t h e  d i s t r i b u t i v e  model. 
(dl  Most Ss  were r ea sonab ly  c o n s i s t e n t ,  t h e r e  were 
h a r d l y  any i n t r a n s i t i v i t i e s ;  t h e  conjoint-measurement 
a n a l y s i s  s t r o n g l y  f avo red  the d i s t r i b u t i v e  and t h e  
d u a l - d i s t r i b u t i v e  model, which cou ld  n o t  be 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e  d a t a .  On psycho- 
l o g i c a l  grounds t h e  d i s t r i b u t i v e  model was favored .  
A f u r t h e r  tes t  of t h e  Coombs and Huang theory  was under- 
taken by Barron (1976). The o r i g i n a l  des ign  was expanded t o  
test  t h e  model when odd-even e f f e c t s  may be opera t ing .  An 
odd-even e f f e c t  r e f e r s  t o  the  f a c t  t h a t  i n  an odd number of 
r e p e t i t i o n s  a f  a play t h e r e  i s  no non-zero p r o b a b i l i t y  asso- 
c i a t e d  wi th  a zero pay-off. Since people might weigh t h e  lose-  
components (rL and pL) more s t rong ly  t h a t  t h e  win-component, 
t h i s  may, i n  t u r n ,  have an e f f e c t  on t h e  perceived r i s k i n e s s  
of odd vs .  even numbers of r e p e t i t i o n s  of a gamble. 
The design was a complete 3 x 3 x 3 f a c t i o n a l  des ign ,  
where t h e  f a c t o r s  r e f e r  t o  t h e  t ransformation a ( g ) ,  b ( g )  
and c ( g )  of t h e  Coombs and Huang study. The r e p e t i t i o n  f a c t o r ,  
c, was set a t  3, 4 o r  5 ,  whereas Coombs and Huang used c 
l e v e l s  of 1 and 5. S s  t a s k  cons i s t ed  i n  rank-ordering t h e  27 
s t i m u l i  according t o p e r c e i v e d  r i s k .  
Based on a con jo in t  measurement a n a l y s i s ,  it was c l e a r l y  
ev iden t  t h a t  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i v e  model was n o t  f u l f i l l e d ,  s i n c e  
s i n g l e  f a c t o r  independence was severe ly  v i o l a t e d  by most of 
t h e  Ss,  e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  the c- fac tor .  One person f u l f i l l e d  t h e  
requirements of t h e  d i s t r i b u t i v e  model, and none any o t h e r  
con jo in t  measurement model. When a l l  gambles w i t h  zero  ex- 
pected value were removed, i.e., t h e  design was reduced t o  
3 x 2 x 3 f a c t o r i a l ,  f i v e  - Ss f u l f i l l e d  t h e  a d d i t i v e  model. 
The r e s u l t s  of t h i s  experiment a r e ,  of course,  nega t ive  
f o r  t h e  Coombs and Huang theory,  b u t  a l s o  o t h e r  c o n j o i n t  
measurement models were n o t  adequate which te l l s  u s  t h a t  there 
was no conjoint-measurement s t r u c t u r e  which r e a l l y  descr ibed  
t h e  da ta .  I n t e r e s t i n g l y  enough, t h e r e  was a r a t h e r  high 
s i m i l a r i t y  of t h e  13 - Ss rankings of t h e  27 s t i m u l i  (Kenda l l l s  
W = .764, x' > 258, p << 0.001) which i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  r i s k  is 
a c o n s t r u c t  which i s  used s i m i l a r l y  by va r ious  persons ( a t  
l e a s t  concerning simple gambles). The ques t ion  i s  on ly  haw 
they  use it. 
The Po l l a t sek  and Tversky theory could no t  be r e j e c t e d  on 
t h e  b a s i s  of Huangls (1971bl d a t a  f o r  r i s k  der ived  by pre- 3/ f e r e n t i a l  choice,  bu t  was r e j e c t e d  f o r  d i r e c t  r i s k  order ings-  . 
Coombs and Bowen (1971) t e s t e d  VE-theory by a skewness t r ans -  
formation on gambles which d i d  no t  a f f e c t  mean and var iance .  
The r e s u l t s  speak a g a i n s t  t h e  theory.  But Po l l a t sek  and 
Tversky (1970) had a l r eady  pointed ou t  t h a t  skewness is a 
problem f o r  their theory  and t h a t  it might be necessary t o  
restrict t h e  range of t h e  theory  t o  symmetric l o t t e r i e s .  
?'A d i r e c t  r i s k  o rde r ing  is  an order ing  of l o t t e r i e s  
according t o  t h e i r  perceived r i s k .  
Huang t e s t e d  t h e  v a r i o u s  r i s k  t h e o r i e s  (expected r i s k  
t heo ry ,  a d d i t i v e  r i s k  t heo ry  of  P o l l a t s e k  and Tversky, and 
polynomial r i s k  t h e o r y  of Coombs and Huang) i n  two exper iments .  
S s  had t o  g i v e  a d i r e c t  o r d e r i n g  of l o t t e r i e s  accord ing  t o  
- 
perce ived  r i s k ,  and t o  exp re s s  p r e f e r e n t i a l  cho i ce s ,  from which 
a r i s k  o r d e r  was deduced by means o f  un fo ld ing  theory .  Due t o  
t h e  complex des ign  and d a t a  manipula t ion,  t h e  r e s u l t s  a r e  some- 
what d i f f i c u l t  t o  eva lua t e .  But some p o i n t s  can be made: 
(1) Direct r i s k  e s t i m a t e s  and r i s k  d e r i v e d  from pre -  
f e r e n t i a l  cho i ce s  seemed t o  b e  e q u a l l y  v a l i d ,  
though they  l e d  t o  d i f f e r e n t  r i s k  o r d e r s  i n  about 
a t h i r d  of t h e  ca se s .  
( 2 )  A l l  r i s k  t h e o r i e s  were more o r  less v a l i d  f o r  
d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  r e s u l t s  of experiment 1, a l though  
t h e  VE-theory is  v i o l a t e d  by t h e  b -opera t ion  f o r  
d i r e c t  r i s k  e s t i m a t e s / .  
(3)  For gambles w i th  f i x e d  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  both  t h e  VE 
and t h e  expected r i s k  theory  were f u l f i l l e d .  These 
t h e o r i e s  cannot  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  co -ex i s t ,  b u t  t hey  
cou ld  n o t  be  s epa ra t ed  on t h e  b a s i s  of Huang's 
exper imenta l  d a t a .  
A f u r t h e r  t e s t  o f  Huang's t heo ry  w a s  under taken by 
Aschenbrenner (1974, 1978) .  H e  v a r i e d  a l s o  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  
:- A L -  
r r r  L ~ & =  1 ~ i L e ~ i e b  i ~ e  usea.  w r  n1s LU S S ,  1 6  were c o n s i s t e n t  
enough i n  t h e i r  r i s k  o r d e r i n g s ;  1 3  OUT of t h e  16 - Ss f u l f i l l e d  
t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  of t h e  expected r i s k  theory.  
4.4. Theor ies  of  Risk P re fe r ence  
Three t h e o r i e s  of r i s k  p re f e r ence  have been proposed t h u s  
f a r .  From them, on ly  Coombsl t h e o r y  h a s  drawn some a t t e n t i o n ,  
whereas K r e l l e l s  fo rmu la t i ons  passed a lmos t  unnot iced,  a t  
l e a s t  i n  t h e  English-speaking world. The t h r e e  t h e o r i e s  w i l l  
be desc r ibed  i n  t u r n .  
4 . 4 . 1 .  Coombs ' Por t fo1 i .o  Theorv 
A t heo ry  of r i s k  p re f e r ence  was developed by Clyde Coombs 
i n  1967. There a r e  some more r e c e n t  fo rmula t ions  of it (Coombs, 
1972, 1975) .  I n  t h i s  paragraph,  on ly  a r a t h e r  in formal  d e s c r i p -  
t i o n  of  t h e  t h e o r y  w i l l  be given.  
4 '~he b-opera t ion  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  t r ans fo rma t ion  b on 
gamble a used by Coombs and Huang (1970b). 
The c e n t r a l  i d e a  of  t h e  t h e o r y  i s  e a s i l y  s t a t e d :  People  
have a  s ing le -peaked  p r e f e r ence  f u n c t i o n  over  r i s k y  o p t i o n s  
w i t h  eq u a l  expec ted  v a l u e ,  i . e . ,  over  l o t t e r i e s .  I n  such a  
s i t u a t i o n ,  it  i s  hypothes ized  t h a t  eve ry  person h a s  a  p r e f e r r e d ,  
o r  " i d e a l "  l e v e l  of  r i s k  f o r  a  g iven l e v e l  o f  expec t ed  va lue .  
A s  t h e  r i s k  of l o t t e r i e s  d e p a r t s  from t h i s  i d e a l ,  h e  l i k e s  
them less. Perhaps you l i k e  some r i s k ;  t o o  much i s  t o o  f r i g h t -  
en ing ,  b u t  no r i s k  i s  d u l l .  J u s t  a l i t t l e  exc i t emen t ,  t h a t ' s  
t h e  optimum. Th i s  n o t i o n  of  s ingle-peakedness  i s ,  a s  b e h a v i o r a l  
s c i e n t i s t s  know, t h e  c o r e  o f  Coombs' un fo ld ing  i d e a  (1953, 
1964) .  
More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  Coombs makes t h e  fo l l owing  assumptions:  
A . 1 . :  From two l o t t e r i e s  w i t h  equa l  expected  v a l u e ,  you 
choose t h e  one w i t h  t h e  r i s k  which you l i k e  b e s t ,  i . e . ,  which 
i s  c l o s e  t o  your " i d e a l "  r i s k  l e v e l  (which may be "no r i s k "  o r  
"maximum r i s k "  o r  an y t h ing  i n  between) .  
A.2.: The r i sk - p r e f e r ence  f u n c t i o n  i s  s ingle-peaked:  There 
i s  one and o n l y  one i d e a l  v a l u e ,  from which t h e  p r e f e r e n c e  de- 
creases on  bo th  sides?/ .  A t h i r d  assumption need n o t  concern  
u s  h e r e .  
I f  t h e s e  assumpt ions  a r e  m e t ,  a " p o r t f o l i o "  s t r u c t u r e ,  as 
Coombs c a l l s  it ,  can  be r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  a  pe rce ived  r i sk - expe c t e d  
v a l u e  space  as shown i n  F igu re  2. 
Coombs p o r t f o l i o  t h e o r y  i s  a p sycho log i ca l -de sc r i p t i ve  
t h e o r y ,  n o t  a  normative one. A s  h a s  been shown ear l ier ,  norma- 
t i v e  t h e o r i e s  p o s t u l a t e  t h a t  t h e  DM wishes  (o r  " shou ld" )  t o  
maximize h i s  expected  v a l u e  (or u t i l i t y ) ,  o r  minimize t h e  " r i s k "  
( v a r i a n ce )  i f  t h e  ex p ec t a t i ons .  a r e  e q u a l ,  a s  assumed i n  Marko- 
w i t z '  p o r t f o l i o  t h e o r y  (which i s  a  t h e o r y  of op t imal  composi t ion  
of s h a r e s  and h a s  t o  be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from Coombs' t h e o r y ) .  
T e s t i n g  t h e  t h eo r y .  A s  one w i l l  have n o t i c e d ,  " r i s k "  i s  
l e f t  undef ined i n  Coombs' theory .  People  a r e  supposed t o  have 
an  i d e a l  r i s k  f o r  any g iven  l e v e l  o f  e x p e c t a t i o n ,  b u t  it i s  n o t  
s p e l l e d  o u t  what r i s k  is .  This  should  n o t  i r r i t a t e ,  s i n c e  
 his assumption may look t r i v i a l  and s e l f - e v i d e n t  a t  a  
f i r s t  g l an ce .  But it i s  n o t .  Consider ,  f o r  example, t h e  t e m -  
p e r a t u r e  o f  t e a  a s  you l i k e  it b e s t .  Most people  p r e f e r  h o t  
tea t o  luke-warm t e a  and h o t  t o  s teaming h o t .  But t h e y  p r e f e r  
c o l d  t o  luke-warm t e a .  I n  a r e c e n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n ,  Coombs and 
Avrunin, 1977a, b )  s t u d y  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  t o  be  m e t  f o r  s i n g l e -  
peakedness t o  a r i s e .  E s p e c i a l l y  i n  m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e  (.n > 2) 
s i t u a t i o n s ,  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  v e r y  demanding. 
F IGURE 2 
Indifference curves and ideal  c re s t  I[d of 
Coombs' portfolio theory 
Perceived .Risk 
Expected Value 
F o r  each level E of expected value there is an  "ideal" risk. The  points o f  
ideal risks are connected by the "ideal crest I [E].  I f  a gamble departs f r o m  
the ideal crest t o  the north, the increase i n  r isk has t o  be  compensatecj by 
an increase in expected value. I f  it departs f r o m  the ideal t o  the  south, 
the decrease i n  risk has t o  be compensated by an increase i n  expected value. 
t h e r e  i s  no g e n e r a l l y  accep ted  d e f i n i t i o n  of  r i s k .  But i n  
o r d e r  t o  t e s t  t h e  t heo ry ,  some "ad hoc" assumptions a r e  ne- 
c e s s a r y .  To i l l u s t r a t e ,  l e t  us c o n s i d e r  t h e  assumpt ions  of 
t h e  Coombs and Huang (1970a) s tudy .  The lot teries used t he r e -  
i n  had t h e  s t a n d a r d  format  (rW, f ,  rL) w i t h  lrLl = rW - k ,  f o r  
v a r i o u s  v a l u e s  o f  rW; t h u s ,  t h e  expec ted  va lue  w a s  always 
p o s i t i v e  and ho ld s  c o n s t a n t  i n  a s e t  o f  such l o t t e r i e s .  
Assumptions (see a l s o  n e x t  s e c t i o n )  
A.1 .  The perce ived  r i s k  i n c r e a s e s  monotonical ly  w i t h  range  
IrW - r I and v a r i a n c e ,  e . g . ,  t h e  l o t t e r y  (30, f ,  -10) i s  L 
judged l e s s  r i s k y  than  (70, f ,  -50) ;  EV = 10 ( c e n t s ) .  
A.2. Repeated p l ay  of  t h e  less r i s k y  l o t t e r y  i s  pe rce ived  t o  
be l e s s  r i s k y  t h a n  a s i n g l e  p l ay  of  a l o t t e r y  w i t h  t h e  same 
expec ted  v a l u e  and e q u a l l y  extreme outcomes, i .e . ,  t h e  same 
range lr - rL l . Example: P l ay ing  (30, f ,  -10)  twice  shou ld  W 
be less r i s k y  t h a n  p l ay ing  (60, f ,  -20) once. Th is  assumption 
seems to be p l a u s i b l e ,  s i n c e  t h e  extreme outcomes of  t h e  
r e p e a t e d  gamble are a l s o  60 and -20, b u t  t h e y  a r e  less l i k e l y  
(.25 i n s t e a d  o f  . 5 ) ,  w i t h  c o n s t a n t  EV. Thi s  assumption h a s  
t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  advantage of g r a n t i n g  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
ana lyz ing  r e p e a t e d  games. 
A.3. I n  c e r t a i n  i n s t a n c e s ,  i t  was assumed t h a t  adding a s m a l l  
amount ( lo$)  t o  r would n o t  i n c r e a s e  t h e  perce ived  r i s k ,  i .e . ,  
w 
(30, %, -10) i s  a t  l e a s t  a s  r i s k y  a s  ( 4  4, -10).  Th is  
assumption is  less e l e g a n t ,  b u t  i t  can be r ep l aced  by o t h e r s .  
These assumptions s e e m  h i g h l y  p l a u s i b l e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
assumptions A . l .  and A.2.; t h e r e f o r e ,  it i s  less s u r p r i s i n g  
that. t h e y  are t h e  core 0.f the Coombs and Huang t h e o r y  of  r i s k  
p r e sen t ed  e a r l i e r .  I t  i s  n o t  t h e  p l ace  h e r e  t o  d e s c r i b e  and 
e v a l u a t e  the r e s u l t s  of e m p i r i c a l  s t u d i e s  i n  any d e t a i l ,  b u t  
t h e  r e s u l t s  s e e m  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  t h e o r y  may d e s c r i b e  
a c t u a l  cho ice  behav io r  v e r y  w e l l ,  a t  l e a s t  f o r  s imple  gambles 
a s  t h e  ones d e s c r i b e d  above. 
4.4.2. Krelle's Axiom System A: Risk-Preference Func t ion  
A f u r t h e r  t heo ry  of r i s k  p r e f e r ence  i s  given by Krelle 
(1968) i n  h i s  axiom system A. Its formal  development i s  
s i m i l a r  t o  s t anda rd  expec ted  u t i l i t y  t heo ry ,  b u t  t h e  lo t ter ies  
are c o n s t r u c t e d  d i f f e r e n t l y .  I n  a l l  o t h e r  i n s t a n c e s  a l o t t e r y  
o r  gamble was d e f i n e d  a s  a p a i r  c o n s i s t i n g  of  an  outcome x i 
and a p r o b a b i l i t y  p = (xi, p i ) .  Krelle d e f i n e s  a l o t t e r y  i t  
as a p a i r  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  a u t i l i t y  ui and a p r o b a b i l i t y  pi, 
$ = (ui, p i ) .  I t  is assumed t h a t  t h e  u i l s  used a s  p r i m i t i v e s  
i n  t h e  t h e o r y  were d e r i v e d  from p re f e r ence  judgments i n  a  
r i s k l e s s  s e t t i n g .  
K r e l l e  t hen  p u t s  f o r t h  e i g h t  axioms, two equ iva l ence  
axioms, two dominance axioms, t w o  c o n t i n u i t y  axioms and two 
s u b s t i t u t i o n  axioms. Since  t h e y  a r e  f a i r l y  s t a n d a r d ,  t h e y  
w i l l  n o t  be p r e sen t ed  h e r e .  The c r i t i c a l  axiom is axiom 9 ,  
which comple tes  h i s  axiom sys tem A, which g i v e s  rise t o  a  
r i s k  p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n .  I t  r e a d s  as f o l l ows :  
Axiom A9 (Independence ) 
B e  L1 = (11, 12, . . , lk, lk+lt . . • , en) and 
- - 
- L2 - (.el, 12, , + , , em) two l o t t e r i e s  
Pi = 1, and L1 -- L2, w i t h  li = (.ui, pi) which have t h e  f i r s t  
i 
k  e lementa ry  gambles l i n  common. I f  t h e  f i r s t  k  gambles are 
r e p l a c e d  by o t h e r  gambles, e l8 ,  lZ1, ..., lkl; li = ( u i l ,  p i r ) ,  
i = 1, 2, ..., k t  and w i t h  e q u a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  sum 
t w o  new l o t t e r i e s  L1' = (llm1 lZ1, . . . , lkl, lk+l , . . . t en' and 
- 
L~~ = (.elm, 1 ,  ..., k t  'k+lt .. ., zm) 
a r e  g e n e r a t e d  and L1' - L2' 
T h i s  axiom te l ls  t h a t  component gambles t h a t  a r e  e q u a l  i n  
t w o  l o t t e r i e s  can  be  r e p l a c e d  by o t h e r  gambles, p rov ided  t h a t  
t h e  sums o f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of t h e  components are t h e  same 
(which i s  neces sa ry  t o  keep t h e  o v e r a l l  p r o b a b i l i t y  no rma l i ze d ) .  
If t h e  l o t t e r i e s  were i n d i f f e r e n t  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  t h i s  
t r a n s f o r m e t i o n  shou ld  n o t  z l t e r  th i s  r e l a t i o n .  Independence 
axioms are t h e  c o r e  o f  eve ry  expec ted  u t i l i t y  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
(F i shburn ,  1970 ) .  
The development of t h e  r i s k  p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n  now pro-  
c e e d s  as f o l l o w s .  L e t  u 1  and u", u 1  < u " ,  be  such  t h a t  a l l  
u t i l i t i e s  i nvo lved  i n  the lo t ter ies  are i n  between, i .e . ,  
u '  < u  I u" f o r  a l l  u. 
Due t o  t h r e e  axioms (Krelle 's  axioms A2, A7, and A8) a l l  
lot teries L1, L2, L3, ..., can  be  r e p l a c e d  by e q u i v a l e n t  
l o t t e r i e s  which c o n s i s t  of  two component gambles o n l y  and are 
based  on  u '  and u" a s  f o l l o w s  ( s o l v a b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n ) :  
Now, from t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  dominance axiom ( A 4 ) ,  it fo l lows  
t h a t  
which i s  immediately c l e a r ,  s i n c e  L1 and L2 have t h e  same 
u t i l i t y  e lements ,  s o  L1 can on ly  be weakly p r e f e r r e d  t o  L2 
i f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  "good" outcome i s  a t  l e a s t  t h e  same. 
Now, a  u t i l i t y  index U i s  a t t a c h e d  t o  each l o t t e r y  L1, 
U ( L 1 ) ,  and a  componentwise e v a l u a t i o n  of t h e  p a i r s  (u, p )  i s  
in t roduced ,  such t h a t  t h e  fo l lowing  two c o n d i t i o n s  ho ld :  
ii) L1 = (el, 12, . . . , ln) = U ( L i )  = F ( l l )  + F ( l z )  + . . . + F ( l n ) .  
The f u n c t i o n  F  i s  c a l l e d  e v a l u a t i o n  f u n c t i o n  f o r  gambles 
(Chancen-Bewertungsfunktion). F i s  now de f ined  a s  fo l lows :  
According t o  t h e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  p r i n c i p l e  (A8) each  i n d i v i d u a l  
gamble l = (u,  p )  i n  a  l o t t e r y  can be  rep laced  by an equiv- 
a l e n t  p a i r  1' = Cu', p ' )  and 1 "  = (u",  p H ) .  Now K r e l l e  
(1968, p. 140)  d e f i n e s  
w i thou t  f u r t h e r  comment. H e  then  proceeds  t o  show t h a t  t h e  
v a l u e  of F ( l )  = p" depends on ly  on l and n o t  on t h e  o t h e r  
gamble i n  t h e  l o t t e r y .  Then K r e l l e  proves t h a t  p r o p o s i t i o n  i 
and ii hold .  Now t h e  c e n t r a l  concept  i s  de f ined ,  t h e  r i s k -  
p r e f e r ence  f u n c t i o n  CRisikoprAferenzfunktion) . 
According t o  axiom 2 ( t h i s  s ays  t h a t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of 
i d e n t i c a l  outcomes can be added wi thou t  changing t h e  o v e r a l l  
u t i l i t y  of  t h e  l o t t e r y ) ,  f o r  0 < p  + q  I 1, 
and, t h e r e f o r e ,  f o r  each  t 1 0 wi th  0  I t p  I 1 we have 
Next, F(u ,  1) i s  de f ined  a s  p ( u ) ,  F(u ,  1 1  = pCu). 
The r i sk -p re f e r ence  func t i on  p has  t h e  fo l lowing  
p r o p e r t i e s :  
- i s  s t r i c t l y  monotonical ly  i n c r e a s i n g  
- can  assume a l l  i n t e rmed ia t e  va lue s  
- i s  con t inuous  over  t h e  e n t i r e  range 
- (un iqueness )  With p be ing  a  r i sk -p re f e r ence  f u n c t i o n ,  
- 
p = a +  b  wi th  b  > 0  i s  a l s o  a  r i s k - p r e f e r e n c e  
f u n c t i o n ,  i .e . ,  p i s  an i n t e r v a l  s c a l e .  
p was o r i g i n a l l y  ob t a ined  f o r  t h e  i n t e r v a l  u '  I u I u " ,  
b u t  t h i s  r ange  can  be  e n l a r g e d  by a  s u i t a b l e  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  
such t h a t  t h e  r i s k - p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n s  a g r e e  w i th  each  o t h e r  
i n  u '  I u I u" .  
A r i s k - p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n  i s  d e f i n e d  by p r o p o s i t i o n s  i 
and ii and by two va lue s .  These s u p p o r t i n g  va lue s  u '  and u" 
a r e  no l onge r  nece s sa ry  now. The v a r i o u s  r i s k - p r e f e r e n c e  
f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  can  arise can  be r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  a p (u )  - u 
sp a c e ,  as shown i n  F i g u r e  3 .  
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A convex r i sk -p re f e r ence  func t i on  i n d i c a t e s  r i s k  proneness ,  
a  l i n e a r  f u n c t i o n  r i s k  n e u t r a l i t y ,  a  concave f u n c t i o n  r i s k  
ave r s ivenes s .  I n  t h e  ca se  of r i s k  n e u t r a l i t y ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
c r i t e r i o n  xi pi (u i )p i  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  B e r n o u l l i  ' c r i t e r i o n  
of "moral e x p e c t a t i o n "  ( u t i l i t y )  xi ui pi. Th i s  i s  an 
im2or tan t  f a c t  t o  be kep t  i n  mind. I t  a r i s e s  from t h e  d e f i n i -  
t i o n  o f  l o t t e r i e s  ove r  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  and u t i l i t i e s ,  i n s t e a d  of 
outcomes ( s ay ,  money). I n  a  s e n s e ,  p ( u )  i s  a  second-order 
u t i l i t y ,  a u t i l i t y  j u n c t i o n  ( c a l l e d  r i s k - p r e f e r e n c e )  over  
c e r t a i n  u t i l i t i e s .  The cho ice  o f  a  r i s k - p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n  
depends on th.e a t t i t u d e  toward r i s k  of t h e  DM, t h e r e  a r e  no 
p r e s c r i p t i o n s  f o r  a  r a t i o n a l  cho ice  o f  a  (convex, n e u t r a l ,  
concave) r i s k - p r e f e r e n c e  func t i on .  
Krelle (1968 ,  p. 146 f . )  compares h i s  f u n c t i o n  p t o  t h e  
t r a d i t i o n a l  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  o f  th.e "anglo-american" l i t e r a t u r e .  
I n  it, moral e x p e c t a t i o n  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  w i th  expec ted  u t i l i t y ,  
. . 
But t h i s  does  n o t  s e e m  t o  be a  good g u i d e l i n e  f o r  d e c i s i o n  
making under  u n c e r t a i n t y ,  s i n c e  two pe r sons  can  v e r y  w e l l  
ag ree  about  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  u t i l i t y  of two h y p o t h e t i c a l  
e v e n t s  (once t h e y  have happened),  b u t  t hey  may d i f f e r  consid-  
e r a b l y  concerning t h e i r  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  t a k e  r i s k s .  One may 
s p e c u l a t e  on t h e  occur rence  of t h e  lucky ,  though h i g h l y  un- 
l i k e l y  e v e n t ,  wh i l e  t h e  o t h e r  c o n c e n t r a t e s  on t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  a  c a t a s t r o p h e ,  a l though  it i s  n o t  l i k e l y  t o  occur  a t  a l l .  
The e v a l u a t i o n  o f  a  r i s k ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, once one 
a c c e p t s  axiom system A,  i s  r ep re sen t ed  by an  i n c r e a s i n g  r i s k -  
p r e f e r ence  f u n c t i o n  p ( u )  such that  t h e  index of  p r e f e r e n c e  U 
can be  g iven  a s  
S ince  t h e  u t i l i t y  u  i s  a func t i on  over  t h e  e v e n t  t o  occur  x j  j  
t h e  above equa t i on  can  be w r i t t e n  a s  
u = x  ' P j  I 
j  
where t h e  f u n c t i o n  $, $ (x . ) = pCu . ( x .  ) ) , i s  t h e  Anglo-American 
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expected u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  I t  c o n t a i n s  u t i l i t y  and r i s k -  
p r e f e r ence  s imu l t aneous ly ,  whereas i n  t h e  K r e l l e  fo rmu la t i on  
b o t h  a s p e c t s  a r e  s e p a r a t e d  which i s  p r e f e r a b l e  i n  h i s  op in ion ,  
s i n c e  bo th  a r e  v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  phenomena. 
K r e l l e ' s  b a s i c  i d e a ,  s e p a r a t i n g  u t i l i t y  from a t t i t u d e  
towards r i s k ,  seems v e r y  r e a s o n a b l e .  But t h e r e  a r e  some 
problems w i t h  h i s  f o r m u l a t i o n .  F i r s t ,  t h e  measurement - theore t i c  
s t a t u s  of h i s  t h e o r y  i s  somewhat dubious .  H e  u s e s  u t i l i t y  a s  
a  p r i m i t i v e - - a  q u a n t i t y  t h a t  i s  supposed t o  be measured i n  a  
fundamental  way. T h i s  is  done i n  expec ted  u t i l i t y  t h e o r y .  
Obvious ly ,  it would n o t  b e  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  measure Krelle 's  u ' s  
by means o f  e x p e c t e d  u t i l i t y  t h e o r y ,  which l e a v e s  o n l y  one 
o p t i o n ,  namely t o  measure it i n  a  r i s k l e s s - c h o i c e  s e t t i n g ,  
e . g . ,  by i n d i f f e r e n c e  c u r v e s ,  c o n j o i n t  measurement, v a l u e  
d i f f e r e n c e s ,  etc.  
While i n  some e x p e c t e d  u t i l i t y  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  p r o b a b i l i -  
t ies  e n t e r  a s  e x t r a n e o u s  v a r i a b l e s ,  as, f o r  example, i n  t h e  
t h e o r i e s  by Suppes ( 1 9 5 6 ) ,  Anscornbe and Aumann ( 1 9 6 3 ) ,  and 
P r a t t ,  R a i f f a  and S c h l a i f e r  ( 1 9 6 4 ) ,  i n  Krelle 's  t h e o r y  p r o b a b i l i -  
t y  a s  w e l l  a s  u t i l i t y  e n t e r  e x t r a n e o u s l y .  "Extraneous"  i s  t o  
b e  unders tood  a s  n o t  measured v i a  t h e  axioms, b u t  e n t e r i n g  a s  
a  known f i g u r e  from o u t s i d e .  
Second, b e s i d e s  t h e s e  r e s e r v a t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  
t h e o r e t i c a l  s t a t u s  o f  axiom sys tem A, t h e  a c t u a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  
of t h e  sys tem may n o t  be  v e r y  p r a c t i c a l ,  s i n c e  a l l  u ' s  have 
t o  be measured i n d i v i d u a l l y  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e .  
K r e l l e  d e s c r i b e s  a  p r a c t i c a l  way t o  a r r i v e  a t  a  r i s k -  
p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n  as f o l l o w s -  Take two r e a s o n a b l e  p o i n t s  A 
and B on t h e  u t i l i t y  a x i s  o f  p o s s i b l e  outcomes (Ergebnis-  
g r b s s e n ) .  Ass ign  A t h e  f u n c t i o n  p (see F i g u r e  4 ) .  
Now t h e  DM h a s  t o  choose  whether  he p r e f e r s  t o  g e t  A o r  
B w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  one  h a l f  o r  C,  which l ies between A and B, 
f o r  s u r e .  It must  be p o s s i b l e  t o  de te rmine  t h e  u t i l i t y  o f  C 
i n d e p e n d e n t l y ,  s o  t h a t  i t s  p o s i t i o n  on u is  d e f i n e d .  C is  
r a i s e d  till t h e  DM i s  i n d i f f e r e n t  between C and (A,  %, B ) .  
Then C i s  a s s i g n e d  a n  i n d e x  v a l u e  of  . 5 ,  which g e n e r a t e s  t h e  
p o i n t  PC on t h e  r i s k - p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n .  
I n  t h e  n e x t  s t e p ,  t h e  DM h a s  t o  choose  between (C ,  %, B )  
and (A, 4,  D ) ,  w i t h  D > B. D i s  r a i s e d  u n t i l  t h e  DM is i n -  
d i f f e r e n t ,  and D i s  a s s i g n e d  t h e  v a l u e  1 . 5 ,  d e f i n i n g  PD on p ;  
etc.  
I f  t h e  a b s c i s s a  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  outcomes xi i n s t e a d  of  i n  t e r m s  
o f  u t i l i t i e s  u,  and t h e  o r d i n a t e  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  u ( x )  i n s t e a d  of 
p ( u ) ,  t h e  p r o c e d u r e  i s  a  s t a n d a r d  one t o  g e n e r a t e  a u t i l i t y  
f u n c t i o n .  S ince  it i s  now made c l e a r  where the u ' s  come from, 
one might  be  s u s p i c i o u s  whe the r  Krel le 's  axiom sys tem A i s  
r e a l l y  something d i f f e r e n t  from a n  expec ted  u t i l i t y  t h e o r y .  
B u t t h i s  i s  a n  open q u e s t i o n  as y e t .  
I f  one t a k e s  Krelle's t heo ry  f o r  g r an t ed ,  one i s  f aced  
w i th  a dilemma: E i t h e r  one ha s  expec ted  u t i l i t y ,  i n  which 
u t i l i t y  p roper  and r i s k  p r e f e r ence  are confounded, o r  one 
h a s  t h e  r i s k - p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n ,  which assumes t h a t  u t i l i t y  
h a s  been measured independen t ly  a l r e a d y .  A somewhat similar 
procedure w a s  proposed r e c e n t l y  by v.  W i n t e r f e l d t  (1978) ,  the 
au tho r  f i r s t  c o n s t r u c t s  a " d i f f e r e n c e  v a l u e  judgment model", 
which i s  then  i n  a second s t e p  t ransformed i n t o  an  expec ted  
u t i l i t y  model. 
FIGLIRE 4 
Method for assessing P(U) 
G e n e r a l i z a t i o n  1 of axiom sys tem A 
I f  pe r sons  e x h i b i t  p r o b a b i l i t y  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  axiom system 
A can be t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  accoun t  f o r  them. The procedure  
(Krelle's axiom sys tem C )  i s  as  fo l l ows :  
C a l l  p* a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  o f  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  p ,  
and p* i s  a  monotonic and s t r i c t l y  i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n .  
S ince  C pi* is. n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  equa l  t o  one,  a s  r e q u i r e d  by 
i 
axiom sys tem A ,  t h e  f o l l owing  c o n d i t i o n  must be  i n t roduced  t o  
accoun t  f o r  t h a t .  Le t  
L1 = ( ( u i I  pi * > I  and 
L2 = u  * I  , i =  1, 2, . . . , n  , 
be  two l o t t e r i e s  w i t h  t h e  same u t i l i t i e s  and modif ied  p r o b a b i l i -  
t i es  p  * and qi* such  t h a t  i 
The o r i g i n a l  wriom A4 h a s  t o  be modj.fied zs £ O ~ ~ _ Q W S  
are two l o t t e r i e s  and c o n d i t i o n  ( i )  i s  f u l f i l l e d ,  and t h e  
u t i l i t i e s  are o r d e r e d  such  t h a t  u, I u2 < ... I un,  and i f  t h e  
- 
p r o b a b i l i t y  pi* a r e  s h i f t e d  towards t h e  more f a v o r a b l e  u ' s ,  
i . e . ,  i f  
k k 
X Pi * 5 x q i *  f o r  a l l  k ,  k  = 1, 2 ,  ..., n  , 
i=l i=l 
t h e n  L1 L2 . 
If t h e r e  i s  a t  least  one  k ,  k  = 1, 2 ,  ..., n-1, such t h a t  
p i *  < q i *  i=l i=l 
and uk < Uk+l  
t hen  L ~ >  L2. The o t h e r  axioms can remain u n a l t e r e d ,  w i t h  p  
r e p l a c e d  by p*. 
The r e s u l t  i s  t h e  gene ra l i zed  r i sk-prefe rence  func t ion :  
This  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  was f i r s t  proposed by Georges Bernard 
(1964, 1965) .  
Genera l iza t ion  2  of axiom svstem A 
Bernard proposes  t o  d e f i n e  p and + f u r t h e r  a s  fol lows:  
where 
a  i s  t h e  e l a s t i c i t y  of  the o v e r a l l  u t i l i t y  of a  l o t t e r y  
w i th  r e s p e c t  t o  u t i l i t i e s  (a  > 0; u  > o)Y,  
c  i s  t h e  e l a s t i c i t y  of  t h e  o v e r a l l  u t i l i t y  of a  l o t t e r y  
w i th  r e s p e c t  t o  p r o b a b i l i t i e s .  
According t o  Krelle, t h e  b a s i c  i d e a  behind t h i s  formula- 
t i o n  is t o  t ake  i n c r e a s i n g  o r  decreas ing  marginal  u t i l i t y  [or 
a t t r a c t i v e n e s s )  of t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  i n t o  account.  
I f  very  s m a l l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  a r e  (a lmost)  neg lec t ed ,  a s  it 
seems t o  be t h e  c a s e  i n  t a k i n g  insurances ,  then  c  > 1. I f  t h e  
r eve r se  i s  t r u e ,  i f  very  s m a l l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  a r e  t aken  v e r y  
s e r i o u s l y ,  then 0  < c < 1. The l a t t e r  could r e f e r  t o  the 
deba te  of " r i s k "  i n  t h e  atomic i s sue .  There,  f a i l u r e  p r o b a b i l i -  
t ies  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  assumed t o  be very  s m a l l ,  b u t  may be taken  
t o  be s u b j e c t i v e l y  l a r g e r  as they numerical ly  are. The same 
l i n e  of reasoning  may hold t r u e  f o r  u t i l i t i e s .  
Bernard 's  fo rmula t ion  c o n t r a d i c t s  axiom system A u n l e s s  x 
i s  a l i n e a r  func t ion  of p,  which can be seen  from A2. Is t h i s  
axiom system accep tab le  f o r  a " r a t i o n a l "  DM? The axioms might 
s e e m  reasonable  as long a s  t h e  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  of p r o b a b i l i t i e s  
pi* r e f e r s  t o  s i n g u l a r  even t s ,  o r  almost s i n g u l a r  even t s .  A s  
soon a s  t h e r e  a r e  many r e p l i c a t i o n s ,  one should assume t h a t  
c - - 1  f o r  z + w  I 
where z denotes  the number of  r e p l i c a t i o n s ,  a reasonable  
assumption f o r  a Bayesian. 
 his remindes somewhat of  Stevens (19591 proposa l  t o  
measure u t i l i t y  a s  a  power func t ion  of  money, u  = xa, w i t h  a 
t y p i c a l l y  being i n  t h e  neighborhood of .5. 
For  any p r a c t i c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  t h e  problem a r i s e s  how t o  
measure t h e  p  *. This  q u e s t i o n  i s  n o t  d i scussed  by K r e l l e .  It i 
must be noted t h a t  t h e  pi* ( a s  t h e  pi i n  axiom system A )  a s  w e l l  
a s  t h e  ui e n t e r  i n t o  t h e  l o t t e r i e s  a s  ex t raneous  v a r i a b l e s ,  t hey  
have t o  be measured i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l ace .  There fore ,  always a  
two-step procedure has  t o  be p r f ~ r m e d :  
( a )  Axiom systeni A: . r i sk -p re fe r ence  func t ion  
1. Measure t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  u t i l i t i e s  ui, i n  a  r e l e v a n t  
range i n  a  r i s k l e s s  s e t t i n g ,  provide  p i ' s  (assumed 
t o  be  known) ; 
2.  deduce r i sk -p re fe r ence '  f u n c t i o n  from p re fe r ence  
judgments between l o t t e r i e s  L = ( (ui,  pi) 1 , i f  
c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  f u l f i l l e d ,  i .e . ,  i f  t h e  DM "accep t s "  
t h e  axioms. 
1. Measure i n d i v i d u a l  u t i l i t i e s  [as above) ; measure 
t h e  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  of p r o b a b i l i t i e s  pi* by some 
adequate  procedure;  
2. deduce g e n e r a l i z e d  r i sk -p re fe r ence  f u n c t i o n  from 
p ~ e f e ~ e X / ~ i  ' L-i, Pi*) 1 
(c) Axiom system A: modi f i ca t i on  2 [Bernard 's  r u l e )  
1. Measure t h e  u i l s  and p  ' s  ; i 
2.  determine t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  a  and c by some adequate  
procedure.  
A s  w i l l  be seen  from t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  i n  t h e  p rocedures ,  
some s t e p s  a r e  n o t  o p e r a t i o n a l l y  d e f i n e d ,  i n d i c a t e d  by ph ra se s  
such a s  "by s o m e  adequa te  procedure" .  There a r e ,  t o  be  s u r e ,  
some procedures  which may l e a d  t o  t h e  d e s i r e d  r e s u l t s .  But it 
must be  s t r e s s e d  a g a i n  t h a t  Krelle's "ax ioma t i za t i ons"  a r e  n o t  
axiom systems of fundamental  measurement. Desp i te  t h i s  f a c t ,  
t hey  migh.t be a p p l i c a b l e  i n  some s i t u a t i o n s ,  a n  answer t o  t h i s  
( i m p l i c i t )  q u e s t i o n  has  t o  be  found e m p i r i c a l l y .  K r e l l e  might 
be r i g h t  wh.en he s t a t e s  t h a t  Be rna rd ' s  c r i t e r i o n  may be a  
s t r o n g  s i m p l i f i c a t i o n ,  b u t  t h a t  it migh.t n o t  be  p o s s i b l e  t o  
measure r i s k - p r e f e r e n c e s  t o  a  f i n e r  degree  anyway. 
4 . 4 . 3 .  Krelle' s Axiom System B: Dispers ion-Preference 
Formulat ion 
Axioms A l t o A 8  ho ld  a l s o  f o r  axiom system B,  b u t  axiom 9A 
i s  r ep l aced  by 
Axiom 9B (d i spe r s ion -p re fe r ence ) :  
The u t i l i t y  index U of a  l o t t e r y  L = {(u l ,  pl) . . . I  (unt P n ) L  
U{L) , depends on ly  on t h e  expected u t i l i t y  u ( t h e  u t i l i t i e s  
a r e  aga in  assumed t o  be given)  
and a  measure of  d i s p e r s i o n  
n  
ii) u* = C f ( . l u  i - a )  pi , 
i=l 
f  being a  non-negative,  s t r i c t l y  monotonous i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  
w i t h  f ( 0 )  = 0 and x  > 0 + f ( x )  > 0. 
1n o t h e r  words, 
U ( L 1  = jJ cu, u*) . 
% i s  c a l l e d  t h e  d i spers ion-pre fe rence  func t ion  of a  person.  
Of cou r se ,  f and must be  def ined  such  t h a t  axioms A 1  A8 
s t i l l  h.old t r u e .  
A l l  t e c h n i c a l i t f e s  a r e  omit ted  he re ,  i n s t e a d  a  s p e c i f i c  
func t ion  w i l l  be g iven  f u l f i l l i n g  t h e  assumptions. I f  one 
d e f i n e s  u* a s  t h e  mean a b s o l u t e  d e v i a t i o n ,  
one has  an  example of  a  permi t ted  d i s p e r s i o n  index.  I n t e r e s t -  
i n g l y  enough, t h e  va r i ance  i s  n o t  a  permi t ted  measure o f  d i s -  
p e r s i o n  i n  t h i s  t h e o r y  (Kre l l e ,  1968, p. 1 5 2 ) .  Now t h e  func t ion  
pl has  t o  be made e x p l i c i t .  K r e l l e  shows t h a t  t h e  s i m p l e s t  
f u n c t i o n  8, t o g e t h e r  w i th  u* a s  g iven  above, which f u l f i l l s  
axiom system B ,  i s  t h e  fol lowing:  
w i t h  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  la1 < 1 / 2 .  I f  t h e  DM i s  r i s k  a v e r s e ,  a  
must be  nega t ive ,  i .e. ,  t h e  expected u t i l i t y  u i s  reduced by 
a  t i m e s  t h e  mean a b s o l u t e  d e v i a t i o n ,  which f u n c t i o n s  a s  a  
measure o f  " r i s k "  i n  this case .  
I n  t h i s  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  l o t t e r y  w i t h  sma l l e r  expected 
u t i l i t y  can  be p r e f e r r e d .  I f  a  = 0 ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n  c r i t e r i o n  
i s  simply t h e  expec ted  u t i l i t y ,  which is  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  r i s k  
n e u t r a l i t y  i n  a x i o n  system A. F i n a l l y ,  i f  a is  g r e a t e r  t han  0, 
t h e  DM i s  r i s k  prone,  b u t  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  somewhat d i f f e r e n t  
from t h a t  o f  system A (see Krelle,  1968, pp. 159-163, f o r  
some more d e t a i l ) .  
I t  is  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  compare Krelle's d i spe r s ion -p re f e r ence  
f u n c t i o n  p wi th  Coombs' p o r t f o l i o  theory  o f  r i s k  p r e f e r ence .  
Coombs t heo ry  s t a t e s  t h a t  a  person has  a  r i s k  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  
each  expec ted  va lue  l e v e l .  Risk is  l e f t  undef ined,  b u t  some 
assumpt ions  a r e  neces sa ry  t o  e m p i r i c a l l y  t e s t  t h e  t heo ry .  
Krelle's sys tem B i s  more g e n e r a l  i n  t h a t  it i n c o r p o r a t e s  a  
d i r e c t  expec ted  u t i l i t y - u n c e r t a i n t y  t r ade -o f f .  Unce r t a in ty  
was g iven  an o p e r a t i o n a l  d e f i n i t i o n  i n  t e r m s  of mean a b s o l u t e  
d e v i a t i o n .  P sycho log i ca l l y ,  t h i s  assumes t h a t  expec ted  u t i l i t y  
and " r i s k "  are compensatory, t o  some e x t e n t  a t  l e a s t .  
What i s  t h e  r e l a t i o n  between axiom systems A and B? B i s  
s i m p l e r  and may b e  i n t u i t i v e l y  q u i t e  appea l ing .  A r e s t r i c t i o n  
i s  i n t roduced  by u s ing  a s i n g l e  index  f o r  c h a r a c t e r i z i n g  t h e  
d i s p e r s i o n ,  t h u s  a b s t r a c t i n g  from t h e  whole d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  form 
o f  t h e  l o t t e r y .  According t o  K r e l l e ,  t h i s  may be a c c e p t a b l e  i n  
t h e  ca se  o f  symmetric d i s t r i b u t i o n s ,  b u t  a  pe rson  i s  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  assumed t o  a c c e p t  t h e  B axioms i f  t h e  o p t i o n s  a r e  
a s  i n  t h e  fo l l owing  example (Krelle, 1968, p. 159) : 
Both l o t t e r i e s  have an expec t ed  u t i l i t y  u v a l u e  of  2.5 and a  
mean a b s o l u t e  d e v i a t i o n  of  .9. I f  axiom system B i s  accep ted  
and u* i s  d e f i n e d  a s  mean a b s o l u t e  d e v i a t i o n ,  t h e n  Ll should  
be e q u i v a l e n t  t o  L 2 ,  i . e . ,  L1 - L2. Krelle s t a t e s  t h a t  many 
r i s k - a v e r s e  pe r sons  w i l l  p r e f e r  L2 t o  Ll,  b u t  one cou ld  n o t  
c a l l  them i r r a t i o n a l .  Krelle's sys tem B has  s t r i k i n g  
s i m i l a r i t i e s  w i t h  t h e  r i s k  t h e o r y  of P o l l a t s e k  and Tversky 
(1970 ) ,  p r e sen t ed  e a r l i e r .  
5. DISCUSSION OF THE R I S K  DEFINITIONS' AND RISK THEORIES 
D i f f e r e n t  a s p e c t s  o f  th .e  v a r i o u s  r i s k  d e f i n i t i o n s  and 
t h e o r i e s  a r o s e  i n  t h e  fo r ego ing  s e c t i o n s .  The d i s t i n c t i o n  
between r i s k  and r i s k  p r e f e r e n c e  is t h e  most fundamental  one. 
While r i s k  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  p e r c e p t i o n  of t h e  r i s k i n e s s  o f  an  
o p t i o n ,  r i s k  p r e f e r ence  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  D M ' S  p r e f e r e n c e  a l o n g  
t h e  r i s k  dimension.  Fur thermore ,  it i s  e v i d e n t  t h a t  r i s k  is  
a  p r o p e r t y  o f  d e c i s i o n  making under  u n c e r t a i n t y  i n  which 
o p t i o n s  ( o r  a l t e r n a t i v e s )  a r e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by p r o b a b i l i t y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n s  ove r  outcomes, which. w e r e  c a l l e d  l o t t e r i e s  o r  
gambles, P r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s ,  i n  t u r n ,  can be 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  e i t h e r  by t h e i r  components o r  by t h e i r  moments. 
The re fo re ,  i t  i s  a lmos t  t r i v i a l  t o  s t a t e  t h a t  " r i s k "  must be a  
f u n c t i o n  of  t h e  components o r  o f  t h e  moments. But it is  a s  y e t  
u n c l e a r  (1) whether t o  ba se  t h e  agg rega t i on  on t h e  r i s k  
components o r  on t h e  moments, and ( 2 )  what t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  form 
i s ,  o r ,  t o  p u t  it d i f f e r e n t l y ,  which a g g r e g a t i o n  r u l e  d e l i v e r s  
a n  a c c e p t a b l e  d e f i n i t i o n  of  r i s k ,  which may t h e n  l e a d  t o  an  
a c c e p t a b l e  t h e o r y  o f  r i s k  i n  a n e x t  s t e p .  A s  t o  t h e  s t a t u s  of 
a  t h e o r y ,  one h a s  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  between ax iomat ic  and " o t h e r "  
t h e o r i e s .  
There are d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  r i s k  which r e l y  on one component 
o n l y ,  most ly  on  p t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  (.or p r o b a b i l i t i e s )  t o  L 
" l o s e " .  I n s t a n c i e s  of such  d e f i n i t i o n s  are "pure  r i s k " ,  o r  t h e  
d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  Norus i s  (1973) and of  S t a r r ,  e t  a l .  (1976, p. 
6 4 0 ) .  T h i s  u s e  i s  much i n  l i n e  w i t h  an everyday use  of  t h e  
t e r m .  Since  it i s  a d e f i n i t i o n  ( a t  b e s t ) ,  it i s  obv ious  t h a t  
it i s  n o t  a x i o m a t i c a l l y  founded, it i s  normat ive  ( a t  leas t  f o r  
t h e  a u t n o r  wno u s e s  ~ t )  and no a g g r e g a t i o n  r u l e  i s  i n v o l v e d ,  
s i n c e  o n l y  one component i s  cons ide red .  
I n  t h e  "low p r o b a b i l i t y - h i g h  l o s s "  f o r m u l a t i o n  of t h e  
problem which i s  o f t e n  used  t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  a  t y p i c a l  " r i s k "  
s i t u a t i o n "  b o t h  k i n d s  o f  components are used.  S i n c e  t h e r e  
are two a s p e c t s  i n v o l v e d ,  l o s s e s  and t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i -  
t i e s ,  t h e r e  must b e  a composi t ion  r u l e  t o  combine t h e  two. 
T h i s  is  accomplished by expec tancy  t h e o r i e s ,  above a l l  
mathemat ica l  s t a t i s t i c s  i n  which r i s k  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  expec ted  
l o s s .  The a g g r e g a t i o n  r u l e  is,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  
o p e r a t o r .  Mathemat ica l  s t a t i s t i c s  i s  c l e a r l y  a normat ive  
t h e o r y  and,  depending on i t s  f o r m u l a t i o n ,  it h a s  o r  h a s  n o t  
a measurement- theore t ic  background. 
I t  h a s  t o  b e  re-emphasized t h a t  " l o s s "  h a s  no s p e c i f i c  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  meaning i n  mathematical d e c i s i o n  t h e o r y  and 
s t a t i s t i c s .  I t  i s  c o m p l e t e l y  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  an  e x p e c t e d  v a l u e  
t h e o r y  ( o r  e x p e c t e d  u t i l i t y ,  o r  s u b j e c t i v e  expec ted  u t i l i t y ) .  
F i n a l l y ,  a l a s t  set o f  d e f i n i t i o n s  which are o n l y  i n  
t e r m s  of  t h e  l e f t  s i d e  o f  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  t h e  semi-var iance  
Vb o r  Vo as d e f i n e d  ear l ier .  H e r e ,  t h e  v a r i a b i l i t y  o v e r  l o s s e s  
i s  t a k e n  as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  " r i s k " .  I n  Markowitz '  p o r t -  
f o l i o  t h e o r y ,  t h e  semi-variance c a n  be used i n s t e a d  of  t h e  more 
f r e q u e n t l y  used  v a r i a n c e .  
Now w e  come t o  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  which l o s s e s  as w e l l  as 
g a i n s  are c o n s i d e r e d .  An obvious  t h i n g  t o  do is t o  c o n s i d e r  
t h e  win and l o s e  components and t o  t r y  t o  f i n d  an a g g r e g a t i o n  
(and w e i g h t i n g )  r u l e  f o r  them. T h i s  was f i r s t  done by S l o v i c  
(1967) ,  who proposed a n  a d d i t i v e  r u l e  and e s t i m a t e d  t h e  we igh t s  
by least s q u a r e s .  Th.is approach c o u l d  be c r i t i c i z e d  s i n c e  t h e  
a g g r e g a t i o n  r u l e  i s  n o t  d e r i v e d ,  b u t  s imply  assumed b y  t h e  
r e s e a r c h e r .  With in  t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  measurement t h e o r y  approach 
o f  Norman Anderson, t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  form c a n  be found o u t  more 
d i r e c t l y ,  a l t h o u g h  t h i s  k i n d  o f  measurement is  n o t  r e a l l y  
a x i o m a t i c  measurement (but  comes somewhat c l o s e  t o  it; see 
Wal l s t en ,  1976, f o r  a  c r i t i c a l  d i s c u s s i o n ) .  T h i s  approach w a s  
taken by Anderson and Shanteau (1970) who found t h e  a d d i t i v e  
model t o  be l e s s  s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  compared with  t h e  mul t ip ly ing  
model. Fu r the r  r e s e a r c h  a long t h e s e  l i n e s ,  o r  adapt ing  t h e  
s t r i c t e r  ve r s ion  of c o n j o i n t  measurement, i s  c l e a r l y  needed. 
The next  c l a s s  of d e f i n i t i o n s  and t h e o r i e s  i s  based on 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of  l o t t e r i e s  i n  t e r m s  of moments. The most 
named moment i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  r i s k  is c l e a r l y  t h e  va r i ance ,  a l -  
though it was obvious from experiments and t h e o r e t i c a l  con- 
s i d e r a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  and t h i r d  moment have some impact, 
too.  Again, t h e  problem of t h e  aggregat ion r u l e  comes up. 
Markowitz, i n  h i s  p o r t f o l i o  theory  avoided t h a t  i s s u e  by t h e  
fo l lowing  dec i s ion  r u l e :  
a .  f r o m t w o  l o t t e r i e s  w i th  t h e  same expected value,  
t ake  t h e  one wi th  t h e  smaller var iance ;  
b. from two l o t t e r i e s  w i th  t h e  same va r i ance ,  t a k e  
th.e one with. h ighe r  expected va lue .  
But w i th  t h i s  formula t ion ,  the va lue  of " r i s k "  is  n o t  determined 
and must be added t o  t h e  model e x t e r n a l l y .  
Two f u r t h e r  c l a s s e s  a r e  e v i d e n t  from t h e  l i t e r a t u r e .  F i r s t ,  
a  l i n e a r  combination of  moments, expected va lue  and va r i ance  a s  
is  most obvious from t h e  r e g u l a r  r i s k  system of  P o l l a t s e k  and 
Tversky (19701, b u t  a l s o  i n h e r e n t  i n  t h e  Coombs and Huang 
theory.  The second p r i n c i p l e  used i s  aga in  t h e  expec ta t ion  
r u l e ,  which u n d e r l i e s  EV, EU, SEV, and SEU theory.  These 
t h e o r i e s  have been c r i t i s i z e d ,  e s p e c i a l l y  by Coombs, s i n c e  
they  do n o t  d e a l  w i th  r i s k  i n  any psychologica l  t r a n s p a r e n t  
and r e l e v a n t  f a sh ion .  
Tversky (1975, I V ,  p. 5 )  says:  "Expected u t i l i t y  theory  
d e a l s  w i th  t h e  problem of  r i s k  through t h e  s lope  of t h e  
u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  f o r  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  a t t r i b u t e ,  e . g . ,  money. 
I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  u t i l i t y  theory  does n o t  permi t  a t t i t u d e s  
toward r i s k  pe r  s e t  on ly  a t t i t u d e s  toward money". I n  h i s  
c o n t r i b u t i o n ,  Tversky shows t h a t  people c o n s i s t e n t l y  v i o l a t e  
expected u t i l i t y  t heo ry ,  s i n c e  they  over-evaluate  o p t i o n s  
which do n o t  have any u n c e r t a i n t y  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  them. 
A g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  of SEU theory  has  been proposed by Huang 
i n  h e r  expected r i s k  theo ry .  I n  it, e x p e c t a t i o n  i s  n o t  taken  
over  u t i l i t y  va lues ,  b u t  r i s k  va lues .  That is, i n s t e a d  of a 
u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  t h a t  a s s i g n s  a u t i l i t y  t o  each outcome, t h e r e  
i s  a r i s k  func t ion  t h a t  a s s igns .  a  r i s k  v a l u e  t o  each outcome. 
The s t a t u s  of  t h i s  t heo ry  i s  s t i l l  a r a t h e r  open ques t ion ,  
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  and empi r i ca l ly .  The no t ion  of r i s k  v a l u e s  o f  
outcomes may n o t  be a  very  appea l ing  concept ,  and e x p e c t a t i o n  
t h e o r i e s  have been c r i t i s i z e d  on t h e o r e t i c a l  grounds, e . g . ,  
A l l a i s  (1953) and Krantz and Tversky (1965) . 
My impression is  t h a t  SEU theory  is inadequate  psycholo- 
g i c a l l y ,  and most l i k e l y  even normat ively ,  and even Huang's 
theory ,  though e l e g a n t ,  i s  t o o  r e s t r i c t i v e  t o  cover  anyth ing  
beyond symmetric gambles w i t h  f i x e d  p r o b a b i l i t i e s .  
A l a s t  word on r i s k  p r e f e r ence .  Coombs' t h e o r y  i s  a 
d e s c r i p t i v e  t h e o r y ,  and it  h a s  a measurement-theoret ic  
foundat ion.  I t  i s  a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  of SEU t heo ry ,  too .  I t  
seems t o  be very  r ea sonab l e  a s  long  a s  s ing le -peakedness  i s  
given.  But,  a s  h a s  been shown by Coombs and Avrunin (1977a, b ) ,  
s ingle-peakedness  is  n o t  a  t r i v i a l  concept  and i s  n o t  l i k e l y  
t o  a r i s e  i n  m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e  s i t u a t i o n s ,  which r e s t r i c t s  t h e  
range of  t h e  t heo ry .  This  remains an  e m p i r i c a l  q u e s t i o n ,  t o o .  
I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h i s  complete ly  d e s c r i p t i v e  t heo ry ,  a  "good" 
r i s k  theory  should  have a normative touch s o  t h a t  it can 
be used f o r  d e c i s i o n  making under " r i s k " .  The two axioma- 
t i o n s  of Krelle have a s t r o n g e r  normative flavor--once one i s  
w i l l i n g  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  axioms. The measurement- theoret ic  s t a t u s  
of  t h e s e  t h e o r i e s  i s  n o t  q u i t e  c l e a r ,  a s  had been po in t ed  o u t .  
No exper imenta l  r e s u l t s  a r e  known which t e s t e d  Krel le ' s  
system. 
6 .  TECHNOLOGICAL AND SOCIETAL R I S K :  A NEW DIMENSION? 
Does " r i s k "  i n  a t e c h n o l o g i c a l  and s o c i e t a l  c o n t e x t  g a i n  
a new dimension? To be r e a l l y  enab led  t o  answer t h i s  q u e s t i o n ,  
w e  have t o  know what w e  mean by " r i s k "  i n  a more e lementary  
c o n t e x t ,  s ay ,  i n  l a b o r a t o r y  exper iments  on l o t t e r i e s .  S ince  
w e  r e a l l y  do n o t  know t h a t  t o o  w e l l ,  we cannot  answer t h e  
second ques t i on .  But t h i s  s t a t emen t  i s  t o o  t r i v i a l  a  way o u t .  
W e  know something i n  t h e  f i r s t  c a s e ,  and we can s p e c u l a t e  on 
t h e  second. L e t ' s  do t h a t .  
The r i s k  i s s u e  a r i s e s  p r i m a r i l y  w i t h  hazards ,  n a t u r a l  and 
man-made. I d e f i n e  hazards  a s  p o t e n t i a l  l o s s  [which i s  t o  be  
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  from expec ted  l o s s ) .  Na tura l  hazards  are 
p o s s i b l e  damages done by t h e  e lements ,  l i k e  f l o o d s ,  and e a r t h -  
quakes.  Man-made and t e c h n o l o g i c a l  hazards  a r e  due t o  t h i s  
( m i s - )  f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  t e chno log i e s ,  such a s  energy p l a n t s ,  
chemical  p l a n t s ,  p l a n e s  and c a r s ,  etc. C i g a r e t t e  smoking, 
a l c o h o l  and d rugs  pose a hazard ,  too .  They a r e  man-made, 
b u t  n o t  t e chno log i ca l .  They cou ld  be c a l l e d  c u l t u r a l  hazards .  
Dangerous i n i t i a t i o n  r i tes  would be  ano the r  example, perhaps  
no t  t o o  f a r  from t h e  f i r s t .  Hazards due t o  wars f a l l  i n t o  
t h e  s a m e  ca t ego ry .  L e t  us  c o n c e n t r a t e  on t e c h n o l o g i c a l  hazards .  
I f  w e  t h i n k  aga in  i n  t e r m s  of  r i s k  components, i . e . ,  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  f o r  win and l o s e ,  and amounts t o  win and l o s e ,  
some very  obvious '  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  emerge: The more hazardous  
( t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  a  technology a r e ) ,  t h e  less l i k e l y .  Car 
a c c i d e n t s  are q u i t e  l i k e l y ,  fol lowed by p l ane  a c c i d e n t s ,  and 
t h e n  major a c c i d e n t s  of a  n u c l e a r  power p l a n t ,  which are 
g e n e r a l l y  cons ide red  t o  be among t h e  l e a s t  l i k e l y  even t s .  Now 
t o  t h e  hazards .  L e t  u s  assume t h a t  t h e  wors t  t h i n g  t h a t  can 
happen i s  t h a t  you l o s e  your l i f e .  Th is  i s  common t o  a l l  
e v e n t s .  I f  one computes t h e  expected l o s s ,  say ,  i n  t e r m s  of 
number of d e a t h s  p e r  y e a r ,  t h e  f i g u r e s  d i f f e r  markedly. 
The more l i k e l y  e v e n t s  have very high f i g u r e s ,  t h e  low p robab i l i -  
t y  even t s  have v e r y  low f igu resz / .  O r ,  i n  o t h e r  words, dea ths  
due t o  c a r  a c c i d e n t s  occur  every day, b u t  t h e r e  has  n o t  been 
any r e a l l y  l a r g e  nuc lea r  acc iden t .  This reasoning can be 
t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o  a simple model wi th  some p r o b a b i l i t y  theory 
f l a v o r .  The p r o b a b i l i t y  of occurrence of  a noxious even t  might 
be  an exponen t i a l  func t ion  of t he  expected l o s s .  Taking 
logar i thms ,  
l o g  p = k - cm , 
with 
P p r o b a b i l i t y  of  occurrence of event ,  
m magnitude of expected l o s s ,  
k, c c o n s t a n t s  t o  be determined e m p i r i c a l l y  . 
Now one can apply extreme value d i s t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h a t .  
Mostly, t h e  assymptot ic  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of maximal va lues  i n  a 
sample i s  supposed t o  fo l low a n  exponent ia l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
func t ion  of t h e  form 
F ( x )  = exp -e -k (x-c 1 , 
with  d e n s i t y  
fCx) = k exp -kCx-cl -e -k (x-c ) 
See, e.g. ,  Apostolakis  (1974). 
Varying a long t h e  dimension of expected l o s s ,  a s  w e  j u s t  
saw, i s  t h e  dimension of s e v e r i t y *  An acc iden t  t h a t  i s  l i k e l y  
r e l a t i v e  t o  o t h e r s ,  such  a s  a c a r  acc iden t ,  w i l l  a f f e c t  on ly  
very  few people,  whereas a major power p l a n t  acc iden t  may 
r e s u l t  i n  a mass ca t a s t rophy .  T h i s  might make a d i f f e r e n c e  
psychological ly-- the  a s p e c t  of ' c a t a s t r o p h i c '  might be more 
s a l i e n t  t han  expected l o s s .  Due t o  n a t u r e  pL and rL seem t o  
be c o r r e l a t e d ,  s o  one cannot  determine wh.at i s  t h e  more 
i n f l u e n t i a l  i n  a c t u a l  r i s k  assessments  which a r e  done in tu -  
i t i v e l y .  With l o t t e r i e s ,  one could ,  i n  p r i n c i p l e ,  vary  pL 
and rL independent ly  of each o t h e r ,  a l though t h e  r e s u l t i n g  
l o t t e r i e s  may n o t  look v e r y  reasonable ,  i f  t o o  extremely 
d e v i a t i n g  from l o t t e r i e s  modeled a f t e r  ' n a t u r e ' .  
A s  you w i l l  have no t i ced ,  nothing h a s  been s a i d  about  pW 
and r t hus  f a r .  It  w i l l  have t o  be analyzed i n  d e t a i l  which W 
r o l e  t h e  ' p o s i t i v e '  components play.  Following e a r l i e r  
Z l ~ h e r e  i s  q u i t e  an extended l i t e r a t u r e  on such  models, 
s ee ,  e - g . ,  Farmer (1967) o r  S l e s i n  and F e r r e i r a  (1976). 
o b s e r v a t i o n s  by S l o v i c  one migh.t conclude  t h a t  t h e  n e g a t i v e  
a s p e c t s  a r e  more i m p o r t an t  t h a n  t h e  p o s i t i v e  ones .  I f  t h i s  
h o l d s  t r u e ,  t h e  v a r i a n c e  o r  t h e  mean a b s o l u t e  d e v i a t i o n  would 
n o t  b e  adequa te  measures,  s i n c e  t h e y  a r e  symmetr ica l ,  weight-  
i n g  p o s i t i v e s  and n e g a t i v e s  e q u a l l y .  Something between t h e  
v a r i a n ce  and t h e  semi-var iance  V (which t a k e s  on ly  t h e  neg- 
0 
a t i v e s  i n t o  accoun t )  may be a p p r o p r i a t e .  
From a b e h a v i o r a l  d e c i s i o n  t heo ry  p o i n t  o f  view, a t  l e a s t  
two q u e s t i o n s  must be r a i s e d :  (1) How can  components be es- 
t i m a t e d ,  and ( 2 )  How a r e  the e s t i m a t e d  components aggrega ted  
i n t o  an o v e r a l l  judgment? Ad 1: People  may n o t  b e  ve ry  good 
i n  e s t i m a t i n g  extreme p r o b a b i l i t i e s  and u l t i m a t e  l o s s e s .  A s  
it is  known from t h e  exper imenta l  l i t e r a t u r e ,  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  
of ext reme e v e n t s  a r e  ve ry  bad ly  a s se s sed .  Even i f  t h o s e  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  a r e  a s s e s s e d  by e x p e r t s ,  one cou ld  have doub ts  
a s  t o  t h e i r  accuracy a s  w e l l .  For  example, when a s s e s s i n g  
f a i l u r e  r a t e s  o f  a  system, c e r t a i n  f a i l u r e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  may 
b e  over looked,  o r  f a i l u r e s  may be c o r r e l a t e d  (common mode 
f a i l u r e s ] ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  t o o  low e s t i m a t e s  i f  n o t  t a k e n  i n t o  
account .  Some p e c u l i a r i t i e s  o f  man's r e a son ing  i n  t h e  s i t u a -  
t i o n  of  u n c e r t a i n t y  and " r i s k "  a r e  d i s cus sed  i n  S l o v i c ,  F i sch-  
h o f f  and L i c h t e n s t e i n  (1976).  One might  f u r t h e r  s p e c u l a t e  
t h a t  it i s  v e r y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a s s e s s  t h e  impact of  a r e a l l y  
s e r i o u s  l o s s .  Ad 2: Some agg rega t i ng  r u l e s  have been d i s -  
cussed  i n  Ch. 5. There i s  no s i n g l e  r u l e  which i s  r e a l l y  
s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  t o  my judgment, 
But t h e r e  may be o t h e r  f a c t o r s  b e s i d e s  t h e s e  r i s k  compon- 
e n t s  which i n f l u e n c e  t h e  pe rce ived  r i s k i n e s s  o f  an o p t i o n .  
Var ious  such f a c t o r s  have been proposed and t o  some e x t e n t  
e m p i r i c a l l y  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  l i k e  v o l u n t a r y  v s .  i n v o l u n t a r y  
( S t a r r ,  1 9 6 9 ) ,  immediacy of  e f f e c t ,  p e r sona l  and s c i e n t i f i c  
knowledge ab o u t  h aza r d s  and t h e i r  p r o b a b i l i t y  of occu r r ence ,  
c o n t r o l  ( c a r  vs .  p l a n e ) ,  a c t i v e - p a s s i v e ,  newness, ch ron i c -  
c a t a s t r o p h i c  ( a l r e ad y  d i s c u s s e d  above ) ,  common-dread, etc .  
See S l o v i c  e t  a l .  (-1977), o r  Otway and F i shbe in  (1977 ) .  
Furthermore,  some peop le  a r e  a f r a i d  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  some new 
dimensions (o f  r i s k )  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  some of  t h e  modern 
t e c h n o l o g i e s .  Extreme s a f e t y  measures cons ide red  n e c e s s a r y  by 
t h e  p u b l i c ,  might  imply extreme c o n t r o l s / .  Extreme c o n t r o l ,  
however, may be beyond t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of a  democra t i c  go- 
vernment,  s o  t h a t  a  more a u t h o r i t a r i a n  k ind  o f  government 
might  t u r n  o u t  t o  be necessary .  
Can a l l  t h e s e  a s p e c t s  be t aken  i n t o  account  t o  f o rmu la t e  
a  s i n g l e  t h e o r y  of  r i s k ?  Which a r e  t h e  mutual i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s ?  
F i r s t  of a l l ,  it may be s a f e  t o  assume t h a t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
8 ' ~ h e  i m p o r t an t  q u e s t i o n  what t h e  s a f e t y  requ i rements  of  
t h e  p u b l i c  a r e ,  i s  l e f t  o u t  he r e .  See,  "How Safe  is S a f e  
Enough", by F i schhof f  e t  a l .  (1977) and Rowe (1977). It  i s  
e v i d e n t  t h a t  t h e  i s s u e  i s  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  r i s k  and r i s k  
p r e f e r en ce .  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  over  outcomes (may it be de f ined  i n  terms of 
components o r  moments) has  an in f luence  on perceived r i s k .  
This  i s  i n d i c a t e d  by arrows i n  F igure  4 below. But t h e  
"psychological"  a s p e c t s ,  i . e . ,  o t h e r  than  those  modeled by a 
p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  ove r  outcomes, may in f luence  per- 
ce ived  r i s k  a s  w e l l .  I f  t h e  in f luence  i s  d i r e c t ,  arrow two 
i s  appropr i a t e .  Then, t h i s  i n f luence  must be modelled ex te rn-  
a l l y  and a d d i t i o n a l l y .  But it could a l s o  be t h e  case  t h a t  
t h e s e  psychologica l  f a c t o r s  i n f luence  t h e  percept ion  and 
t h e r e f o r e  t h e  assessments  of t h e  components, a s  i n d i c a t e d  by 
arrow t h r e e .  I f  t h i s  i s  t h e  rou te  of i n f luence ,  a dec is ion-  
t h e o r e t i c  model, i f  adequately  formulated,  i s  s u f f i c i e n t .  I t  
i s  f u r t h e r  e v i d e n t  t h a t  a  correspondence must e x i s t  between a 
measure o f  r i s k  and perce ived  r i s k .  This  correspondence,  how- 
e v e r ,  need no t  be a one-to-one correspondence, s i n c e  a  "good" 
r i s k  theory  must a l s o  be a  normatively appea l ing  and normatively 
v a l i d  theo ry ,  and pe rcep t ions  w i l l  probably n o t  fo l low p resc r ip -  
t i o n s  completely.  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e r e  must be  a  consid- 
e r a b l e  correspondence,  s i n c e  o therwise  no one would accep t  t h e  
r i s k  measure (and t h e  theory  it i s  der ived  from) as a presc r ip -  
t i v e  o r  "normative" theory .  Perhaps some k ind  of  path-analyt-  
i c  modeling, which i s  suggested by t h e  diagram, might h e l p  
t o  c l a r i f y  which way t h e  psychologica l  f a c t o r s  a f f e c t  r i s k  
pe rcep t ion ,  i f  they  do. 
For completeness sake ,  l e t ' s  go t h e  remaining pa th  through 
our  l i t t l e  model. A f t e r  t h e  a s p e c t s  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n s  have 
been formulated--again component vs .  moment--the necessary 
assessments  ( e s t i m a t e s )  have t o  be made. Next, t h e  a s ses sed  
components must be aggregated t o  y i e l d  a measure of r i s k .  The 
aggrega t ion  is n o t  independent of t h e  modeling of t h e  
s i t u a t i o n ,  of  course .  
How t o  proceed f u r t h e r ?  My persona l  f e e l i n g  would be t o  
c o n c e n t r a t e ,  i n  a  f i r s t  s t e p ,  on a s p e c t s  of l o t t e r i e s ,  t o  
improve assessments  of t h e  components, i . e . ,  e s t i m a t e s  f o r  
smal l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  and f o r  l a r g e  l o s s e s ,  and t o  improve ou r  
unders tanding  o f  how they  combine i n t o  an o v e r a l l  measure of 
r i s k .  
But l e t ' s  come back t o  what we have t o  do. W e  have t o  
dec ide .  How do we want t o  .dec ide?  The g o a l  is,  of course ,  
t o  make "good" d e c i s i o n s ,  t o  se t t le  f o r  t h e  b e s t  op t ion .  
Decision theo ry ,  based on e x p e c t a t i o n  theory ,  is  a normative 
approach f o r  d e c i s i o n  making under unce r t a in ty .  Is it a l s o  
appropr i a t e  f o r  d e c i s i o n  making under " r i s k " ,  i . e . ,  a  s i t u a -  
t i o n  i n  which n e g a t i v e  consequences a r e  r e a l l y  nega t ive ,  
a l though n o t  l i k e l y  t o  occur  a t  a l l ?  My r e s e r v a t i o n s  c e n t e r  
around t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l  d e c i s i o n  making under uncer ta in-  
t y  i s  an expectancy theo ry ,  " r i s k "  i s  i n t e g r a t e d  ou t .  EU o r  
SEU theory  may (or  may n o t )  be  p e r f e c t  f o r  r epea tab le  even t s  
such a s  investments  o r  i n su rances ,  b u t  may be very inapprop- 
r iate under t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  desc r ibed  above. So what we r e a l l y  
have t o  do i n  t h e  long  run  is  t o  develop a  b e t t e r  normative 
theory  of d e c i s i o n  making under " r i s k " ,  which must be d i f f e r e n t  
from t h e  e x i s t i n g  theo ry  of d e c i s i o n  making under u n c e r t a i n t y .  
FIGURE 5 
Model of Relationship Between Decision Theoretic Ascpects, Psychological Aspects, 
and Perceived Risk 
, 
decision theoretic assessments of components, aggregation rule measure of 
aspects, components e.g., assessment for assessed risk r perceived risk 









A one-headed arrow " + " 
indicates influence, 
a two-sided arrow "- " correspondence. 
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